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Major Professor
You-you -- if you have failed to understand
The fleet of England is her all in all
On you will come the curse of all the land.
Which Nelson left so great -
You-you -- who had the ordering of her Fleet,
If you have only compass 'd of her disgrace.
When all men starve, the wild mob's million feet
Will kick you from your place -
But then too late, too late,
— Lord Tennyson
(Times of April 23, 1885)
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INTRODUCTION
From pre-historic times man has been challenged and fascinated by
the sea. So even before the davm of civilization he had built a 'dug-out'
by hollowing the tree trunks which he used to cross the river or stream.
Gradually he became more and more civilized and with the civilization his
knowledge of shipbuilding also improved. The Egyptian, Athenian and Roman
ships clearly show that change.
As the time passed man's knowledge of science and technology improved
which in turn influenced the shipbuilding. During Roman tiroes, ships were
built of oak. The planks were placed edge to edge and were fixed with
dowels and pins. Accounts of the invasion of England by Julius Caesar in
55 B.C. show that the Celts also had ships whose hulls were more flat than
those of the Romans. This was done because of the shallowness and tides of
the English Channel, By 450 A.D. Viking types of long boats were built by
the Scandinavians who used this type of ship to invade England. These
vessels were also built of oak with a heavy shaped keel reaching well
below the skin of the ship. Transverse strength was obtained by a number
of ribs and frames. One of the most important characteristics of this
type of ship was that they used to be double-ended with high bow and stern
and with single mast and sail. By 900 A.D. further changes were made in
ship designs of Scandinavia and England was not far behind in this respect,
Alfred the Great saw the value of sea-power and built vessels to fight
against the Danes. The design of his ship was not different from that of
the Vikings but the form of the ship was changed to suit better the rough
water of the English Channel, The Norman rulers of England also did not
make any change in the design of the ships. From this time until 1400 A.D.
there is little knowledge of the development of ships except for the pictures
given by the seals of some of the English towns. During that period England
used her navy, except under Henry V (1413-1422). He had a fleet of 1500
2
vessels to provide transport for his troops to France during the campaign
which led to Agincourt.
Gradually, by the sixteenth century, with the creation of new trading
routes, an improvement in the British navy can be traced, Henry VIII in
1512 issued letters patent to Sir Edward Howard to take charge of the
3
king's ship and all matters of crew and cost. He set up the dockyards
at Woolwich and Deptford and began to make Portsmouth more suited for naval
work. In 1514 he issued a charter "for the relief, increase and augmenta-
tion of the shipping of this Realm of England." The numerical strength
of ships was increased during the reign of Elizabeth. From then onwards
the number of ships increased without a considerable change in the design
and method of shipbuilding. So from the sixteenth century to the later
part of eighteenth century there was hardly any change in the construction
of ships.
A change can be traced in the ship design and method of shipbuilding
from the second decade of the nineteenth century. Naturally the question
arises why this sudden change came? Was it due to political, economic or
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or industrial and technological developments or was it due to the develop-
ment of armor and guns? In the following chapters an attempt will be made
to show whether all these factors played the same role or one of these had
the more effect than the other.
CHAPTER I
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SITUATION FROM 1815 to 1893
"The first article of an Englishman's political
creed must be that he believeth in the Sea..."
f -- Marquis of Halifax (1694)
What the Marquis of Halifax said on this occasion epitomizes the idee
fixe of the English nation since ancient times. During the nineteenth
century one of the great economic forces at work in the world was the mechan-
ical inventiveness of the British, which gave them an increasing control over
nature. By the end of the eighteenth century England had attained a degree
of personal freedom undreamt of by other continental powers; she provided the
mechanism and much of the capital which transformed agricultural into indus-
trial states. So naturally the quesion arises whether the English in the
nineteenth century still had faith in these developments and tried to improve
or rebuild the navy to match these economic and technological changes. Again
if they improved the navy then what led them to do so: foreign rivalries,
economic development, scientific discovery or technological change? The
following section of this work attempts to show whether or not the political
situation affected the nineteenth century British navy.
The navy, during this period, altered its essential purpose it
changed its traditional role of knightly warrior to that of police constable
1
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keeping order amidst the new global conditions created by the Industrial
2
and French Revolutions.
\ *
When the twenty year old Anglo-French War was over in 1815, a long
period of peace began. In spite of this, the sea was still unsafe due to
the activity of pirates who preyed on peaceable merchantmen using the
regular trade routes. The Royal Navy, aided by a U.S. naval expedition to
the Barbary Coast, continued to put down piracy and finally freed the sea
from its depredations. The Royal Navy also committed itself to getting rid
of the Slave Trade throughout the world. At the same time peace was main-
tained, not only a peace for Britain but the peace oi Britain: the celebrated
3
Pax Britannica ; and the important role of maintenance was for various reasons
performed by the Royal Navy,
The military and naval might of the continental land powers was so
weakened by the Napoleonic Wars, as to leave the Royal Navy supreme in the
world at a time when sea power was of increasing moment. Great Britain was
the only major nation to take advafltage of this factor; indeed apart from
the United States, she was the only nation in a position to do so. Unfor-
tunately she did not foresee the necessity of changing her naval system in
any fundamental way.
By 1820 steam was introduced in the Royal Navy but the attitude of
the government and the public was not favorable toward the steamship, Henry
Dundas and Lord Melville, the First Lord of the Sea (1812-1827), stated in
the 1820's:
Their Lordships feel it their bounden duty to discourage
to the utmost of their ability the employment of the steam
2
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vessel, as they consider that the introduction of steam was
calculated to strike a fatal blow at the naval supremacy of
the Empire.^
The main fear of and objection to the steamship in British eyes was that it
created a more effective bridge over the Channel; that it could enable the
strong French army to cross the sea easily and quickly and to attack the
British coast suddenly, not being as dependent on the wind or on the
physical labor of the crews as was the sailing ship. This fear of French
invasion, bolstered by traditional Anglo-French rivalry, combined with the
many remarkable scientific discoveries to mould British naval developments
and policy during the greater part of the century.
From about 1830 to 1839, the English public, especially that part
of it living on the South coast, suffered from the obsession that the intro-
duction of the steam warship and the steam transport enabled the hostile
French suddenly to invade the defenseless shores of England. For it was
a commonplace, if paranoiac, attitude that the French wished to take revenge
not only for Trafalgar and Waterloo, but also for Crecy and Agincourt. More-
over, this fear was not entirely baseless. Because Portal, the French Min-
ister of Marine, "advised the French Government either to abandon the
institution to save expenses or to increase the expenditure to save the
institution" and finally convinced the French Government to use a greater
effort and to spend a huge sura of money to build up a strong navy. Eventu-
ally they made such great progress that some of the French Admirals, when
the Syrian crisis of 1840 developed, thought their country was more than
prepared to hold her own. Thus the development of steam navigation and the
4
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growth of the French naval power not only alarmed the public, but Lord
6
Palraerston, then the Foreign Secretary, as well. One of the main causes
of panic was a pamphlet published in 1844 by the Prince de Joinville, son
of Louis Philippe, who was in charge of the navy at that time. In this His
Highness said:
The steam war vessel lessened for the French navy its
chronic embarrassment for an adequate supply of trained
seamen, that it made more feasible the transposition of >
condition of land warfare (by means of boarding) in which
the French supposedly excelled, to maritime combat and
that it greatly enhanced the commerce harrying potenti-
alities of the guerre de course
,
as well as the feasi-
bility of overnight raids on the British coast.
^
When the entent cordiale was destroyed by the incident of the Spanish
marriages, the French Chambers passed the great naval program of 1846 pro-
viding 93 million francs for new construction. For by 1845 the French had
turned resolutely to the construction of the steam navy hoping to find a
naval force of more mechanical character to compensate for their poverty
in seamen. France knew that she had to face many difficulties to fulfill
her ambition. Still she was determined to build a strong navy which if
not great enough to cope with that of her powerful rival on equal terms,
would at least be able to challenge English dominance. The navy envisaged
by the French in their Law of 1846 was not intended to dominate but to
prevent all domination on the seas by the English. Half a century later
we find the same attitude, expressed by von Tirpitz and von Bulow and in
the preamble of the German Navy Bill of 1900.
6
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When the Whigs returned to office in England in 1846, Palmerston,
as Foreign Minister, at first declared to his colleagues that France could
throw twenty to thirty thousand men across the Channel in steamers in one
night. By 1848, Palmerston, the Duke of Wellington, who was Commander-in-
Chief of the land forces, and Lord Auckland, the First Lord of the Admiralty,
thought that the French might complete no less than seven ships of the line
and thirty steamers within two years. Lord Auckland was especially perturbed,
still more so by the wide dispersal of the British fleet over the seven
seas, and by the difficulty of raising men rapidly in Britain to serve
either ashore or afloat. He said:
I feel nevertheless that no dispostion nor possible
augmentation of our naval force could altogether secure
our coasts from aggressions of a desultory, or even worse
those of a serious character, and that this country cannot
be regarded as safe until it shall be in such a condition
a^ may enable the government, to collect at a very short
notice large bodies of men well trained to arras.
While the Cabinet was discussing the problem of coastal defense and the
reconstitution of the militia, the public suddenly became highly agitated
by the publication in early 1848 of a letter written almost a year before
by the Duke of Wellington to Sir John Burgoyne, Inspector General of
9
Fortifications. In this letter the Duke asserted that the development
of steam navigation had exposed all ports of the British coasts to invasion
with the result, that from Dover to Portsmouth there was not a spot on
the coast, save that immediately within range of the guns of Dover Castle,
"on which the infantry might not be thrown on shore at any time of tide.
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with any wind, and in any weather." The brief panic produced by this
letter was promptly made worse by Russell's proposal of an increase of
five pence in the income tax in a year of financial distress.
All of this forced the British public to believe that the French
would invade England suddenly without any declaration of war, and there
was a widespread fear in the country that the national defense was inade-
quate. Sir Charles Wood, a member of the Parliament, described this saying
that people had got into the habit of talking of the landing of the French
on the Sussex coast as a circumstance to be expected, almost as a matter
12
of course. Even Lord Palmers ton believed that peace could only be
maintained if the British navy remained supreme; as he put it, "....the
best way of keeping any men quiet is to let them see that you are able and
13determined to repel force by force...." However, he himself admitted on
many occasions between late 1846 and 1852 that there would be no immediate
danger. What he was afraid of. Professor Bartlett thinks, were the possible
consequences which might arise from one of the many Anglo-French incidents,
occurences of which were unavoidable, since the subjects and the interests
14
of the two powers were opposed in so many parts of the world. But the
c ,.
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French navy of 1846, in spite of all the fears, could not in any sense be
considered as the equal of her British counterpart of that period. Richard
Cobden pointed out that the English looked at the French figures and never
at their own. It was a repeated phenomenon in the early twentieth century
during the Anglo-German rivalry. A slight increase in the French naval
budget was dissected and every item analysed in the British Parliament.
In this light can the British naval scare of 1848 be explained. The French
tried hard to secure a naval strength of at least two-thirds that of the
British navy, but this alarmed the British so much that the naval budget
was increased and number of ships also raised. The British did this even
when the two states were supposedly cooperating to try to put an end to
the political confusion and turmoil in Portugal. It seems that the British
hierarchy had no confidence either in the power of the French Government
nor in its honesty. This was clear when in 1849 the French Government
wished to open negotiations for a reciprocal reduction in the naval race,
the British refused on the ground that Great Britain would never be reduced
to the policy of fixing the size of her navy with reference to the force
maintained by any other single power. The same attitude can be traced
again in 1889 when England declared her Two Power Standard against France.
Thus the nature of the fear hardly changed in the international situation
of the nineteenth century as the method of handling these situations
remained much the same.
The coup d' etat of December 2, 1851 in France and the approval by
plebiscite of Louis Napoleon as the President of the Republic with almost
autocratic powers gave a new and more vigorous life to the invasion fear
than before. There were floods of sensational pamphlets and speeches
which led Britain into a major panic. Palmerston carried an amendment
-8-
strengthening Lord John Russell's proposed Militia Act and the Admiralty
hastened preparations to ward off a surprise attack. Professor Baxter
has commented that the proclamation of the Second Empire in 1852 reminded
the British of earlier invasion scares, and produced an electric effect
upon the whole country. The people talked of invasion as if it could
be accomplished in five minutes. The Times , in this case reflecting,
rather than attempting to mould, public opinion, criticised naval policy
with a cartoon depicting an ass with its tail pointed at a row of French
16
guns and braying "no danger." This forced William Stanley, 14th Earl
of Derby to assure his fellow peers and the public:
My Lords, I believe that our naval forces were never
in better or more effective condition than at this moment,
I believe that for all purposes whether as regards the
protection of our own shores, the defense of numerous and
distant colonies which form our empire or for the protection
of that extended commerce which crosses every sea and fills
every port in the wide world, I believe that, for such
purposes, our navy was never in a more effective state than
it is now.^^
In 1851 Granville, Landsdowne, and Russell concluded that Louis Napoleon
wished to keep peace for the moment. Still Russell thought that if the
French made further concentrations of war steamers then the British
squadrons on the Tagus would have to be recalled for he could not trust
a Bonaparte. However, the French navy was definitely weaker than that
of the English during this time. Still the fact remained that France was
her most likely and most dangerous rival. Even, in November 1853, when
England and France jointly entered into Crimean War, the First Lord of
J, P, Baxter, Introduction of the Ironclad Warship
. 98.
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the Admiralty felt that he could not ignore the character of the French
naval development and tried to improve the British navy. Thus from
1815 to 1854 the fear of war with France was mainly responsible for the
development of the British navy because whenever there was any improve-
ment in the British navy the public thought the French would immediately
imitate them and would probably have a better navy.
In August 1855 that French Commission Superiure Centrale had pro-
posed a program of new construction which comprised 40 screw ships-of-the
18
line of 70 to 90 guns, 20 frigates, 30 corvettes, and others. However,
this 'new program' had hardly any effect on British naval construction.
By February 1857 the results of tests upon the new rifled guns had con-
vinced the French that the use of armor had become imperative if ships
were to live through an action and thus they concentrated their attention
on the building of an ironclad fleet.
In March 1858 the great revolution came into naval architecture
when the first four ironclads were ordered by the French Navy namely: the
wooden hulled La Gloire, L'Invincible . La Normandie and La Couronne . The
design of La Gloire was based upon that of Napoleon , a screw line-of-
battle ship, allowing some 500 tons more of displacement and increasing
the waterline length 19% feet but retaining almost the same beam and
draught so as to secure finer lines to permit of equal speed with the same
engine power. In England the idea prevailed for many years that La Gloire
19
was merely a wooden warship that has been raised, armoured, and renamed.
^^Oscar Parkes, British Battleships from 1860 to 1950 , (London: 1957), 2.
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As a matter of fact. La Gloire was an entirely new ship, built from the
keel up, and her principal dimensions and general construction were "pro-
foundly modified" from those of Napoleon . The deplacement of La Gloire
was 5620 tons, 500 tons more than that of Napoleon . M. Dupuy de Lflme,
the designer of La Gloire
,
proposed to obtain equal speed from the same
horse power by giving her 6 metres more length on the waterline than his
Napoleon
,
with practically the same beam and draft. Despite the Increased
tonnage, the immersed midship section was of only 101 square meters. The
elimination of deck structures and the great increase in the weight of the
ship's side caused by the armour, raised problems of transverse strength
which were met by introducing a layer of sheet iron under the wooden
upper deck, strongly fastened throughout to the sides of the vessel.
The news of the laying down of the French ironclad fleet in March
reached London in May 1858 and this news created a panic in England. La
Gloire and her sisters were described as 'huge polished steel frigates'
and credited with power which, although they 'plunged some persons into
20
deep distress.
.
.were manifestly put forward to excite our foolish fears'.
Because of this panic a Parliamentary committee was formed in 1858
to inquire into the relative naval strength of the two countries and the
report, published in 1859, showed that both England and France had 24
ships-of-the-line built or being completed while France had 34 large
frigates (not including the ironclads) against 26 for England, The Admi-
ralty soon found itself in a quandary. Their hardships were divided as
to whether England should follow the French lead and outbuild them in
ironclad, or build both ironclads and wooden ships, modifying the building
20
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programs as circumstances dictated; or whether England should build up
British superiority again along traditional lines with the requisite
number of wooden ships. The latter was the course adopted for a short
time. But soon the Admiralty realized that the greatly increased power
of ordnance rendered it necessary that measures of increased protection
should be taken. Finally the Admiralty decided to build the ironclads
and approved plans for the first British sea-going ironclad ship, H. M. S
Warrior
.
The scarcity of ironclad ships threatened the feeling of security
which had long characterised the British admiralty so that their Lordships
increased its ironclad program from one ship to four before the end of
1859, and rushed to complete enough wooden screw line of battleships to
attain the desired Two Power Standard in 1861. Soon the French ironclad
program forced the British to increase their own proposed plans from
four to six ironclads; the British also stopped the construction of large
wooden ships except for casing them in iron. Moreover, throughout the
year of 1860, the current of opinion in favor of ironclad ships grew
steadily stronger. When in the 1860s the Institute of Naval Architects
was founded, it was in favor of ironclad ships. Volumes of Hansard for
the period also reveal the growing anxiety lest France had taken a too
21
long a lead in the new course of naval construction.
II
From the naval standpoint, the Crimean War serves,
in many ways, as an unnatural climax to the period and
21
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for this and other reasons it may well have had a distort-
ing effect upon mid-nineteenth century naval history.
To explain just why this was the case involves an examination of the
Crimean War, ' . '
Sir Laird Clowes has contended that by 1854 the British could have
possessed a fleet of fast, screw, armored capital ships and gun boats,
23
armed with large-calibre, rifled ordnance. Yet, during this period
more interest was shown in iron and armor protection than the Admiralty
was nominally credited with. Political and financial circumstances, the
various responsibilities of the navy during war and peace time and the
advantages which Britain was known to possess in naval warfare as it then
was, worked together with undoubted conservative sentiment to inhibit
progress. The dogged ranks of senior officers found it difficult to adapt
themselves to the new condition of warfare. At first they looked upon
steamers as unworthy of duties other than those of lowly tugs or dis-
patch boats and only sued them as such. Until 1827 no steamship was
entered on the Navy List. Only in 1845 was the paddle abandoned and the
screw propeller finally adopted. Although there was a shortage of timber,
iron was not accepted until just before the Crimean War as a shipbuilding
material because early tests appeared to show that an ironship was more
vulnerable to shell fire; the holes could not be stopped and a single
broadside might sink a ship. So during this period the administrative body
of the navy, instead of preparing for new kinds of ships, was attempting to
22
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perfect the former types by fitting conventional ships of the line and
frigates with shell guns and some even with auxiliary steam power. Their
success in this direction perhaps left them ill-prepared for the revolu-
tionary changes that were to come during and after the War,
In 1848 the longest ships to be fitted with the screw propeller were
the four- (ex- third) -rate ships, which were being converted into block-ships
for harbor and coastal defense. A second-rate, with steam power, had been
ordered, and there was talk of converting three more second rates to steam.
Progress remained tentative, because of the continuing unreliability of the
steam engine, its great bulk, and its heavy fuel consumption in proportion
to the power produced. Machinery and coal took more space, so that in the
case of the sixty-gun blockship, Hogue . it was suggested that the gross
over-crowding in that ship could be relieved by the sacrifice of one- third
24
of its armament. Yet progress in the design of steam engines and machinery
was continued; the transatlantic mail ships of Samual Cunard and others
proved that as boiler pressure crept up so fuel consumption fell. In the
smaller classes of warship, steam power of some form was becoming almost
indispensable. By January 1852, work upon all sailing ships of the line had r
been suspended in the expectation that all capital ships would at least be
steam assisted within ten years. It seemed sufficient merely to seek an
adequate margin of superiority in steam over France, and at this time Britain
possessed seven such ships, afloat, being converted or on the stocks, against
only two French ships. -
In August 1853 a naval review was held at Spithead which served the
purpose of a warning to Russia. At first sight, the assembled ships differed
24
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little from those which fought at Trafalgar. On closer inspection they
were somewhat different; by this time England had seven screw-powered
and three-sailing line-of battleships, four screw frigates, four paddle
frigates, four each of screw corvettes and of sloops and one paddle
corvette. The only difference between the steam- powered, screw-assisted
sailing ships and the traditional ships of the line and frigates was that
they were longer editions of the latter. In May 1854, the government
petitioned Parliament for /252,674 for the purchase and repair of steam
machinery with the comment that it was to be used to apply "that power
which experience has proved indispensable to all the ships of the new
.25
construction as they were launched." Having reached the conclusion that
it was expedient to have a reserve force at home, the government determined
all the vessels of that fleet should be steam powered. Of the Allied fleet
sent into the Black Sea, only two of the ten line-of-battleships were
equipped with steam, and these were seven smaller ships and all but one
were paddle steamers. Later these ships were joined by twelve additional
steamers and two sailing ships. A naval expedition to the Baltic formed
part of the offensive against Russia in 1854, but it accomplished little
because most of the ships were of too heavy a draught for inshore work in
that shallow sea. The fleet had no local pilots and merely harassed the
Russians by capturing their merchant ships and blockading their ports.
Great Britain and France entered the Crimean War believing that
the sailing line-of-battleships in their fleets might still be of some
use. But action proved that in the company of a large number of steam
men-of-war, ships propelled only by sail were useless. Moreover, the
25
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use of the shell gun was also having its effect upon ship construction. At
the start of the Crimean War, the destruction of Turkish ships by the
Russian shell fire scared both England and France and finally the naval
architects of both countries decided that ironships would be less affected
by shell fire than wooden walls and attempts were made to build the former.
In 1857, at the end of the Crimean War, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, Sir Charles Wood, on reading before the House of Commons a com-
parison between the English and French fleets declared, "At this time,,, the
sailing vessels ought, almost , to be left out of consideration, for I do
not think that except in case of urgent necessity any nation would dream of
sending a sailing squadron to sea." In addition to the question of age,
condition and lines of the hull, the British requirements in stowage
rendered that decision necessary. After conversion of 9 sailing line-of-
battle ships to steamers of the same gun capacity, it was found that the
change reduced by more than one-half the space available for stores and
provisions, which had the effect of limiting the cruising range of the
vessels. To the British this was unsatisfactory because to reduce the
gun component drastically was likewise impracticable. The only solution
was to build new vessels of larger size, a solution they were soon forced
to accept.
The vessels built in these last days of the wooden ship averaged
from 25 per cent to 50 per cent greater in tonnage than their predecessors
in each class. For instance, H. M. S. Duke of Wellington ^ and Duke of
Marlborough y of this period ranged from 3,000 to 4,000 tons burden,
whereas the greatest ships of the pre-steam era had not exceeded 3,000
26
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tons. Indeed the new steam frigates were as large as the old three deckers
r. r . 27
at Trafalgar.
The naval rivalry between England and France was not a very promi-
nant feature of the 1870*8 and in consequence no considerable change or
improvement can be noticed during this period, in contract to the 1880 's.
The Admiralty was opposed to a great battleship program in the eighties
because to keep pace with France required many technological changes and
development. These and the rapid scientific discoveries usually made
vessels obsolete in a short space of the time. The government also did
not want to accept an inferior naval position in comparison to that of
France but it had to reverse its attitude and in March 1889 the Naval Defence
Act was introduced. It increased the number of the battleships and pro-
vided for 8 first-class battleships, which were larger than any previously
built, two second class battleships, nine large and 29 small cruisers,
four fast gunboats and eighteen torpedo gun boats; in addition the Two Power
Standard was officially adopted. The populace in general felt a little
safer than before, a sense of security visible in Admiral Bacon's writings,
when he expressed the idea that there was no doubt that if England should
go to war with the French then the latter might well have been swept off
the face of the globe. The Naval Defence Act as well as providing security
28
had in fact saved the country.
The naval scare and the subsequent Naval Defence Act of 1889 led
the British public to take an interest in the' Royal Navy. Indeed the news-
papers behaved so sensationally during this time that they were responsible
27
Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: 1941), 74.
28Quoted by A. J. Marder in The Anatomy of British Sea Power, (Hamden^
Conn.: 1964), 119.
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to some extent for the naval scares and panics. This is perfectly de-
scribed by J. A. H. Hobson in his Physchology of Jingoism ;
The modern newspaper is a Roman arena, a Spanish bull-
ring and an English prize fight rolled into one. The
popularisation of the power to read has made the press the
chief instrument of the burtality.^
The various naval scares, because of Anglo-French naval rivalry,
and the Crimean War made a large contribution in changing and consequently
in improving the British navy of the nineteenth century. Thus this century
saw a new epoch in English history because the whole navy changed its
essential character, as Michael Lewis has noted in his book The Navy in
30
Transition . The navy changed both in nature and in purpose. Ship
Construction was revolutionised to a large extent during this period, and
in its turn changed the nature of vessel operation. The people trained
to work the old full-rigged wooden walls, propelled by the airs of heaven
and armed with broadsides of smooth-bore, solid-shot guns, had to learn
how to handle great iron-hulled, iron-armored monsters, propelled by steam
and firing by means of huge built-up guns there new elongated and rotating
shells. The following chapters will attempt to illustrate the technologi-
cal changes in ship construction, and show why they were important.
29
J. A. H. Hobson, Psychology of Jingoism
,
(London: 1953), 29,
30
Michael Lewis, The Navy in Transition
,
9-10.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
We tore the iron from the mountain's hold,
By blasting fires we smithied it is steel;
Out of the shapeless stone we learn is mould
The sweeping bow, the rectilinear keel.
--John Masefield: The Ship
Man has always desired to dominate nature and to explore all her
mysteries; hence the motivation behind his desire traverse oceans and to
discover unknown lands. This adventurous and inquisitive spirit led him
to build boats at the very dawn of civilization; through the ages he has
developed and improved the method of constructing such ships.
Since ancient times wood had been used to build boats. By the time of
the Tudors, however, the English forced the problem of supply of timber
with which to build ships. The danger in the past had always lain, and
would still in the future lie, in the shortage or even the unavailability
of timber suitable for maritime purposes. This problem was rendered more
acute in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, not merely by the
shortage of timber, but also by the fact that wooden hulls decayed very
rapidly when they had to perform the increasingly arduous duties expected
of them at that time. Thus this basic position remained unchanged.
British naval strength relied heavily upon the fruit of the forest.
Although many people sought to conserve forests, the demand for
timber in an increasingly industrial age was voracious and tended to
-19-
outstrip supply. Apart from the greater needs for timber for shipping,
more was being used for the domestic arts. With greater population
more land was brought under tillage; since this gave more profit than
from woodlands, which tied up money for long periods. From 1760 to
1805 the Royal Navy grew from 320,000 tons to over 700,000 tons, with
more than 900 vessels, of which some 180 were ships of the line. By
.
2
1810, tonnage had risen by another 100,000 tons. Out of the 700,000
tons raised by 1805, the Royal Navy had used up over 1% million loads of
timber.
Much oak had traditionally come from the Baltic, though by 1809,
the spread of Napoleon's power had checked very attempt of the British
to secure timber from the ports dotted around the entire European coast
from the Baltic to the Black Sea, The "little corporal" however, could
do nothing to prevent the use of timber from North and South America, Asia
and Africa,
But soon the supply of timber from the United States was also
almost at a standstill. This occured because Jefferson inaugurated a policy
of "peaceful coercion," in reprisal for. the British attitude toward neutral
ships; and because of this trade with England was permitted for only ten
months from 1807 onwards. The Embargo Act of 1807, forbidding all trade,
was followed by the Non-Intercourse Act in 1808, which prohibited trade
with England. This alarmed the Navy Board for the future of dockyard
Sir Westcott Abell, The Shipwright's Trade, (New York: 1963), 95.
2
Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power . (Cambridge, Mass.: 1926), 404,
The unit of timber measurement was the 'load' of fifty cubic feet.
Roughly, the average oak of timber size contained about a load of timber
and made nearly a ton of shipping. It weighed about a ton and a quarter.
In 1804, straight oak timber ranged from 4.3s to 7.16s, a load, according
to its size, the oak of average dimensions being about •<'7,
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supplies and they began to search remote corners of the whole world for
trees which had not been considered in the survey of 1804. It was, however,
quite difficult to transport timber from distant forests. Oak had begun
to come from Canada; this supply was increasing rapidly in magnitude, but
except in the case of timber suitable for the great masts, its quality
left much to be desired. Skilled lumbermen were scarce, transportation was
difficult and expensive, and after the trees were cut, and even after they
were brought to England, the quality of timber often cried out for its
rejection.
The extreme need for timber during the Napoleonic period also led
to several efforts to relieve the shortage by building ships in foreign or
colonial ports. The most successful attempts to relieve the time shortage
by foreign shipbuilding came from the use of teak in India which was later
recognized as the best ship timber in the world. The distance between
England and India, the old policy of building all warships in England and
the lack of cooperation by East India Company, which occasionally diverted
timber from naval construction to their own ships, all had tended to pre-
vent a further use of this possible source of relief. As for the furture
the Thames builders strongly opposed Indian shipbuilding because they were
afraid that the high quality of teak and cheap labor might ruin their
business. ' - ' .'^''- •-•'' ' "^
The supply of English oak was also slow in recovering from the
tremendous drain of the Napoleonic era. The plantings stimulated by the
shortage around 1810, taking some 40 years to mature to usability, could
not be of service when they were most needed.
One of the surprising features of the whole naval timber problem
was the seriousness with which it was taken in 1860-61, the very last years
-21-
of wooden capital ship. Although the Admiralty, because of Paixhain's
shells and the results of Crimean War, built ironclad warships, it was
still unconvinced that the days of wood were over. Even in later days
there were plenty who could say with a certain dockyard official: "Don't
talk to me about ships of iron-- it's contrary to nature." The shortage
was felt acutely in the matter of certain pieces of large English oak in
parts of the frame where foreign timber could not be used, like the con-
struction of the stern post, for the increase in the size of the ships of
the line necessitated trees of larger diameter than ever before for that
purpose. Great trees were cut down only to be found rotten, and ships
remained uncompleted on the stocks while the woods were searched for
the rare trees of suitable size and soundness. When such trees were found,
there was not time for seasoning, and much green oak had to be used. By
1859 the woods of England could not meet the demands of naval building
programs of the day.
By the nineteenth century, England had almost reached the apex of
that development which resulted from the Industrial Revolution, and con-
sequently this century differed from all previous ones. Prior to this
time agriculture had been the basic means of production in society, but in
the nineteenth century, industry had replaced it as such. Population grew,
and rate of increase in Britain was particularly high between 1780 and 1820;
by 1840 the population was being supplemented at the rate of 300,000 persons
every year.'^ The century between 1801 to 1901 saw an increase in the British
population from nine to thirty-two million. The census of 1871 retraced
the ground and arrived at the following figures for the total population
W. H. B. Court, A Concise Economic History of Britain from 1750 to
Recent Times, (London: 1954) , 13.
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of England and Wales estimated to raid-year in each case:
1801 9,192,810
1811 10,467,728
1821 12,190,175
1831 14,070,681
1841 16,049,554
1851 18,109,410^
The demand for, and consumption of, industrial products of all kinds in-
creased enormously, "A civilization based on the plough and the pasture
perished— in its place stood a new order, resting perhaps dangerously on
coal, iron and imported textile materials."
The possibility of a stoppage in the trade in pig iron with Northern
Europe between the period 1796 and 1801 and its realization during the winter
of 1800-01 stimulated the English to increase their own production of iron
and to discover improved methods of iron making. Pitt, the then Prime
Minister, increased the duty on all imported iron and by 1798 it became
3.15s.5d per ton. This affected the English iron workers tremendously
as Professor Ashton described:
It appears by the Scarcity and Dearness of Iron since
the Dispute with Russia and Sweden, that there is not Iron
enough made in Great Britain to supply the consumption.
The Iron Masters take every Advantage of a Scarcity to
raise the Iron, while the Manufacturer of goods cannot
raise his price, which is very hurtful, and keeps many
industrious Tradesmen from reaping the fruits of their
Labours."
H. L. Beales, The Industrial Revolution
,
1750-1850
^
(London: 1958),
68-69.
^Ibid. , 30.
T. S. Ashton, Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution
^
(Man-
chester: 1924), 145.
^Ibid. , 145.
^Ibid., 146.
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In 1801 and 1802 there were no fewer than. 22 new furnaces in blast
and 25 in process of erection and by 1803 English iron effectively
replaced Russian and Swedish ironI. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars the
English iron industry again found Itself with a capacity for production in
excess of the immediate peacetime needs of the country, and there was a
general fall in iron prices as is shown by the following figures relating
to the average prices per ton of forged pig iron in the Midlands:
8 d
1801 ...... 6. 15.
1802 6. 0.
1803 6. 0.
1804 5. 16.
1805 6. 8.
1806 6. 15.
1807 6. 1. 3
1808 6. 5.
1809 6. 5.
1810 6. 6.
1811 6. 5.
1812 5. 10.
1813 5. 2. 6
1814 6. 0.
1815 5. 0.
1816 3. 15.
1817 4. 5.
1818 5. 10.
1819 6. 2. 6
1820 4. 10.
1821 4. 0.
1822 ..... 3. 15.
1823 4. 0.
1824 5. 0.
1825 7.
.
10.
1826 5. 0.
1827 4. 10.
1828 4. 0.
1829 3. 12. 6-,
1830 3. 8. 9II
the pig iron of the world and witllin the! next t hirty years she trebled her
10
Ibid.
^^Ibid., 150.
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12
output of this commodity. Between 1830 and 1850 the west of Scotland
became a producer of more than a quarter of Britain's pig iron. In 1854
official mineral statistics were first collected. These were to show for
the following year over 500,000 tons of iron ore, with an average content
of something like 55 per cent of iron had been absorbed by Scotland,
South Wales and Staffordshire. The output of processed pig iron from
those same three districts had risen in 1855 to something like 260,000
tons. The rise and fall of the absorption of ore and the production of
pig iron by the main areas of the iron industry over the thirty years
following 1855 was as follows:
12
J. H. Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain
. Vol. II,
(London: 1952), 47.
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After 1815, Britain expanded her trade with the newly independent
countries of South America which had previously been part of the mercanti-
listic system of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires. In her trade with
these countries, Britain favored laissez-faire principles. Previously she
had been a 'mercantalist' country, and her own Empire was largely to remain
so, until the free trade boom of the 18AOs. But having witnessed the serious
defeat of her major imperial rivals, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and France,
she became the trading company of the world and consequently the ruler
of the seas by sheer dint of having to protect both her newly won, and her
old imperial, trade routes. The change in her prevailing economic policy,
from mercantilism to free trade was primarily a result of necessity, but
had a firm doctrinal basis in the teachings of Adam Smith and his laissez-
faire followers of the late eighteenth century. This school argued that
Britain, as the first industrialized nation in the world, must be free
to trade throughout the world without the artificial hindrances of the
mercantalist system. Only thus could a nation of small shopkeepers survive.
Hence the period of thirty years after 1815 was one of gradual change from
mercantalism to free trade, a slow change within the increasingly neglected
remains of her first great Empire, but a speedier change in the case of
trade with the one time possessions of her defeated enemies, outside the
bounds of this empire. . .
This change brought with it another in Britains'
whole conception of what the seas were for; from 'seas which are ours'
to the "Mare Nostrum' idea to the 'Freedom of the Seas' with its inevit-
able corollary, 'the Safety of the Seas'. 'All seas freely open for
all became her watchword'. 'Let all increase the volume of their
traffic there on, and all be the gainers '.^^
13
Michael Lewis, The History of the British Navy
.
(London: 1957),
214.
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The protection of the Empire and its continued expansion after
1850 was one of the main functions of the Navy in the nineteenth century.
In 1800 the empire consisted of about one and a half million square
miles, the vast majority of which had been gained in the previous half
century. This imperial expansion increased the relative weight of England's
overseas possessions in the balance of power within Europe. During this
period more emphasis was given to the trading bases upon which the Empire
continued to rest. Hence the addition to it, of places like Singapore in
1819, Cyprus in 1878 and Zanzibar in 1890. In the acquisition of each of
these the navy played an important role. Even in military operations the
navy helped the array by providing it with heavy artillery, as happened
15
during the Boer War.
The main reason for this imperial expansion, as already stated, was
the economic revolution which made Britain the workshop of the world. In
1801 her exports totalled 80 million tons; in 1901 1,467,000. At the same
time, especially after the construction of the ironship, there was a
remarkable expansion of her mercantile marine. In 1815 its gross tonnage
16
amounted to 2,400,000; in 1850 to 3,505,000, and in 1880 to 6,575,000.
Production was so high that foreign trade was more important to the national
economy than ever before, for it was the means of supplying not only the
luxuries and comforts of life, but food and raw materials required for the
daily subsistence and employment of the mass of the people.
14
Christopher Lloyd, The Nation and the Navy
^
(London: 1954), 225.
^^Ibid. , 226.
Ibid
.
Op. cit. . 78.
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The Royal Navy's role in this scheme was thus vital. As Vice-
18
Admiral Sir John Fisher, First Sea-Lord, in 1905 said:
The Navy is the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th.., ad infinitum
Line of Defense^ If the Navy is not Supreme, No Army how-
ever large is of the slightest use. It's not invasion we
have to fear if our Navy is beaten, IT'S STARVATION . ^^
Moreover, the rise of private yards for building men-of-war gave the concept
of British naval supremacy additional support in both parliament and public
opinion. Thus in the nineteenth century the navy was still the first line
of defense. By 1815 England entered upon a new era of international
commerce and competition, and this new era demanded not merely a new type
of warship, but of merchant vessel as well. It had to be much faster than
the ships of even twenty years before and of much greater carrying capacity.
The introduction of iron into the navy was to prove of great value
to England if for no other reason than just to free her from the timber
problem; yet in these first year of the 1860s when all signs pointed to
iron as the coming material, the Admiralty still called for more timber and
set its face against innovation. In spite of this, the end of the era of
wooden warships came suddenly. By 1866, though timber was still needed in
18
Fisher, John Arbuthnot, First Baron Fisher of Kilverstone (1841-
1920), was born in on the 25th January 1841. He entered the Navy in
1854, He served in the Baltic during the Crimean War. In 1874 he was chosen
to serve as President of the Committee, which was appointed to revise "The
Gunnery Manual of the Fleet." He became the Director of Naval Ordnance and
Torpedoes in October, 1886 and he remained in the post till May, 1891. He
served as A.D.C. to Queen Victoria (from 1887 to 1890). He also served as
Lord Commissioner of the Navy and Comptroller of the Navy during 1892 to
1897. He was Vice Admiral in 1896, He was awarded K.C.B. in 1894 and
G.CB. in 1902. He became First Sea Lord in 1902 and served in that
capacity to 1909. He had a predominant influence in all the far reaching
new measures of naval development and internal reform. In November, 1909
he was created a Peer, and retired in 1910, He again became First Sea
Lord from 1914-15 and he was consulted over the Gallipoli Campaign of 1916.
19
As quoted by A. J, Marder in The Anatomy of British Sea Power
,
p. 65,
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small amounts for the teak backing of armor plates and for deck planking,
iron had become the main material for the navy.
The Admiralty wanted to build ships of timber, but because of the
industrial revolution, because of the increase in the availability of
iron ore, and because of the timber problem the Admiralty was forced to
use iron for construction of ships. Thus economic conditions were largely
responsible for the change in ship construction.
CHAPTER III
TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
In the cosy security of the Victorian era, warfare
and science took the floor together and commenced
their dance macabre,
--Sir Stephen King-Hall (Sea-Saga)
I
In the 1850s and 60s, despite her great technological lead in
industry and her vast merchant navy, Britain did not produce any great
naval advances. It has been said: "She imitated changes introduced
by France and America; and imitated so clumsily that naval shipbuilding
passed through a baroque phase." But still, because of the industrial
revolution and because of the pressure of public opinion, which have
already been mentioned, and especially because of technological advance-
ment, the Admiralty was forced to make changes in the navy throughout
the nineteenth century, which put the navy well on the road to becoming
the "Navy of Fisher, of Jellicoe, and of Cunningham."^
The small supply of timber and availability of cheap iron led the
shipbuilders to become interested in ironship construction; whereas a
wooden ship cost about /16. 10s. per ton, an iron ship could be built
David Thomson, England in the Nineteenth Century
, ( 1815-1914)
(London: 1950), 98.
2
Michael Lewis, The Navy in Transition : A Social History 1814-1868
(London: 1965)
, 9.
*
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for not much more: £ 18. 10s per ton.^ Moreover, the destructive force of
shell fire against the wooden walls was more clearly realized from the
1840s, and especially during the Crimean War, so that the governments of
the principal maritime powers made numerous efforts to find some means
to minimize the damage inflicted by these shells. Finally some naval
architects decided that the ironships would not be least affected by
shells. Moreover, iron construction and the adoption of armor were
interdependent in that the iron-hulled ship was better suited to the
carriage of heavy metal plates than the wooden ones. Shells had made the
large wooden ships exceedingly vulnerable objects. The abandonment of
wood not only lessened this weakness but also removed the rigid upper
limits on size which the use of the timber had imposed. The preeminent
position of Britain's metallurgical industries facilitated this development
which was due not to the need to protect against the shells, but to the
superiority of the iron over the wood as seaworthy material. Early
experiments, however, were with iron construction in the merchant marine
rather than in the Royal Navy.
The main reason why the Admiralty did not encouarge the ironships
was that they did not believe iron would float. Again, if iron vessels
did not sink under their own weight, the engines, the Admiralty thought,
would cause them to say, while the reciprocating motion of the engines
would cause fractures of the plates. Moreover, there was a fear that the
introduction of iron warships would be greatly to the disadvantage of the
Royal Dockyards as these were more suitable to the great wooden line-of-
battleships.
E. C. Smith, A Short History of Marine Engineering . (London: 1937),
97.
^Ibid., 96.
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The first iron steamer, the Aaron Manaby
,
was built by the
Horsley Company of Staffordshire for the Seive, under a patent taken out
in 1820 in France for an iron steamboat.^ But the Admiralty ignored
this second great technological development of the century.^ In 1839
the John Laird Company who had proposed a design for an iron frigate in
1836, found the East India Company less conservative than the Admiralty.
For the Company it constructed in 1838 two iron paddle steamers namely:
the Plaefiethon and Nemesis, which were used effectively as gun boats in
the First Opium War of 1839-40. Only then did iron begin to oust wood
as the basic material for hulls. In 1845 the Admiralty ordered a number
of iron frigates, but that authority now was ahead of public opinion.
A popular outcry of "Hands off our wooden walls" checked the Admiralty's
enterprise and forced it to retreat. Thus the iron frigates were degraded
to the status of troop ships.
8
'
I. K. Brunei realised the need to give lengthwise strength to
a vessel 322 feet long, 51 feet broad and which weighed some 3600 tons
at 18 feet draught of water. The skin was carried on transverse ribs of
iron and fixed there by iron rivets. At the bottom part of the ship were
laid ten deep lengthwise beams above which ran an iron deck (not water-
tight) fixed by rivets to angle bars at the upper part of the beams.
133.
6
5
Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, (Princeton: 1949),
David Divine, The Blunted Sword, (London: 1964), 21.
Michael Lewis, The History of British Navy
. (New York: 1959), 225.
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Isambard Kingdom Brunei (1806-1869) was the only son of Sir MarcIsambard Brunei. At the age of seventeen he began to work in his father's office
r'^J:Tt°''. u ''f
^°"' ^"'^"' ^°^ ^^^'^Ses were under way. He worked for the
fo™.d ?«?. 'i''^^- ,°" ^'^ ^'^'" ""^^ ^^"^ "^«^^^^ Steamship Company was
18^ t" ]ll.
^"d settled a design for an ironship which was started in
u !!
^''^™^ engineer to Australian Mail Company and built twoShips. He was best known for the great magnificent failure. Great Eastern
.
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This in effect formed a "double bottom." The angle ribs, some 20-24
inches ^art were carried up above the upper deck. Two lengthwise
bulkheads, running from the top to the bottom of the ship, one on each
side, added to the lengthwise strength and formed the sides of the
boiler room. The side spaces were used as coalbunkers and were tied to
the ribs by cross-beams to form a strong member for transverse strength
and to support the thin iron skin. Brunei, instead of using beam knees,
used angle struts to form a closed triangle fixing the beam ends. There
were five main bulkheads across the ship which added to the transverse
strength and being watertight gave greater measure of safety after damage.
There were two decks of wooden planks carried by iron beams to the ends
of which were fixed heavy wooden water ways scarphed and bolted to the
frames and to the iron "stringer" plates fitted at the side of the ship.
The top or sheer strake of the side plating was made stronger by an outer
strap run lengthwise and 6 inches wide and an inner strap 7 inches wide -
9both one inch thick - which were fiiced to the plating by rivets.
Advocates of iron construction argued that it increased the
strength, solidity and durability of ships and reduced the fire risk.
It decreased the hull-weight, increased the cargo space and facilitated
water-tight subdivisions. It saved money in construction and repair, and
would make possible the building of much larger vessels and the better
utilization of the screw, which produced leaks in the sterns of the
wooden ships. They pointed out that several iron ships which had run
aground had sustained remarkably slight injuries. However, they never
said that these vessels would prove inpenetrable to shot and shells; in
9
Sir Westcott Abell, The Shipwright's Trade, 114-116.
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fact what they actually said was that a single 10 or 12 inch shell ex-
ploding at the water line might sink a frigate or even a ship-of-the-line.
Such projectiles, it was believed would have far less effect on an iron
ship, passing through both its sides and leaving a smooth round hole,
which dould be easily stopped. Actually their argument was that iron was
of superior quality to wood as a material for shipbuilding.
Attempts were made at Portsmouth in July and August 1851 to
ascertain the effect of 8 inch and thirty- two pounder shot on vessels
with plates 3/8 or 1/2 inch iron with regular timbers throughout instead
of iron ribs and on vessels having 5/8 inch iron ribs with teak planking
outside and inside, instead of iron plates. The conclusions were that all
shots would pass through 3/8 inch iron without splitting, but that solid
shot would sometimes, and hollow shot would very generally, split on pass-
ing through 1/2 inch iron with high charges; that the injury to the
farther side of an iron ship would be severe and that even with a vessel
planked with wood, shot striking iron ribs as compared with shot striking
wooden timbers would cause more dangerous splinters and greater danger to
the far side of the ship.
English experiments conducted between 1846 and 1851 convinced the
Admiralty of the unsuitability of iron vessels for war service because of
this weakness, and influenced decisively the course of the naval con-
struction in Great Britain. The weakness of ironships can be summarised
as follows:
1. The holes made by the shot were not irregular but are clean
and open; all parts of the shot passed right through the iron and the
timber and then spread abroad with considerable velocity; parts of the
iron plate and a few very small pieces of shot were sometimes retained
in the timber.
10
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2. With high charges the splinters from the shot were
numerous and severe, with the addition in this, of the evils that other
vessels were subject to, that of the splinters from the timber. ^^
So by 1850 the Government informed the contractors carrying mails to
British possessions that after 1850 no iron vessel would be approved
even for mail service. Hence the iron frigates which the Admiralty
had previously ordered had to be converted into transports. Despite
the strong prejudices against iron which prevailed at the Admiralty, 58
of 286 gun and mortar boats and vessels built by contractors for the
12Royal Navy between 1854 and 1857 were constructed of iron. In the
state of metallurgic development of that time, iron was more vulnerable
to shell than oak as the tests between 1846-1851 proved. The splinter-
ing of the iron made a hole much larger than the size of the shot itself
and ona almost impossibls to close during the course of an engagement.
Yet solid shot penetrating wood left a clean hole which, because of the
tendency of wood to expand and partially close the opening, could be
easily plugged. Moreover, when a wooden ship went into action, the
ship's carpenter usually took a position below the gun deck, where he
could plug shot holes as soon as they occured. The ironships were so
new that no such system was considered.
The government and the public did not believe that iron could
float. By the time the government attitude and. public opinion became
favorable to the iron ship, the Admiralty realized the problems involved
in the building and the maintaining of the ironships. The construction
11
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of ironships involved new methods and very few men were conversant in
them. Thus there were very few craftsmen in this field. This change
in building ships from wood to iron has been described in the following
manner
:
So long as the frame of the earlier ship had been
built of naturally curved timbers of Italian and English
oaks. Her inner planking and trussing were of English,
African or Dantzic oak; and this structure, apart from
the outer planking, had been formed into a compact solid
water-tight structure, which, even unplanked, would have
floated securely.
She had been built by shipwrights, aided by sawyers,
blacksmiths, joiners, millwrights, and caulkers. Ship-
wrights had fashioned wooden moulds in the mould-loft for
cutting out and trimming the timbers to agree with the
curves and lines of the "drawings of the ship"; they had
trimmed the timbers and planks with axe, adze and plane;
they had made moulds for all iron forgings, they could
make her masts and yards and boats.
Her timbers and planking would now be useless; the
art of preparing moulds for them is practised no longer.
Even the boats which the ship carries are now steam
vessels; and the art of wooden mast-making is a lost art
in His Majesty's Dockyards. The ship might himself has
well nigh vanished. There are still men bearing that
name and using axe, adze, plane and anger, but outside
the Royal Dockyards the shipwright has no longer any-
thing to do with building the structure of the ship.
The art of shipbuilding has passed into the hands of
platers, riveters, cautlers, fitters and other workers
in iron and brass, and their Unions have shut out the
shipwright. The Shipwrights Union now only claims to
make moulds, to fair the fraiming by ribbands to make
and break stages, to lay decks, to lay blocks and to
launch ships. Boiler makers now call themselves iron-
ship builders and engineers undertake all ship fittings.
The major problem of maintaining the ironship was to control
erosion and fouling, especially in foreign ports. Oscar Parkes, in his
British Battleship 1860-1950 . has discussed it vividly. Both toredo
worn and marine growth could be countered by Copper Sheathing,
13
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ia which the anti- fouling properties are due to the
action of sea water forming oxychdondes and other
soluble salts which do not adhere to the uncorroded
copper, and are continually being washed away, leav-
ing a smooth surface upon which plants and animals
can not become attached... The attachment of the
copper sheets presented no difficulties as they could
be nailed directly on the wooden skin; but with an
iron hull any such intimate connection leads to
galvanic action between the copper and the iron, and
even a very indirect connection is sufficient to PfP"
duce gavanism with consequent pitting and erosion.
But the copper was expensive and this expense led to experiments with
other materials like blunz metal and zinc; however, nothing came of
them.
The developments in shipbuilding were possible because of general
development in the iron industry. Development in the iron industry was
due to five great inventions: these, together with the earlier discovery
of the artificial blast to accelerate combustion, brought the transition
to the modern era in the metallurgy of iron. These five revolutionary
changes were: (a) the employment of coke instead of charcoal in the
reduction of the ores, (b) the puddling process and the utilization of
the reverberatory furnace, (c) the invention of the rolling process,
(d) the hot-blast process and finally, (e) the invention of the steam
15
engine.
In the beginning the iron industry was dependent on the use of
charcoal as a fuel in the blast furnaces. The supply of charcoal depended
on the supply of suitable timber was
14
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becoming increasingly scarce, considerably hampered progress in the
iron industry. The substitution of coke for charcoal in the smelting
process brought about a major progressive change in the iron industry
during the early eighteenth century. This was effectively introduced
by Abraham Darby. Coke smelting was directly applicable only to the
production of cast iron. Until the middle of the eighteenth century
the new process seems to have been almost entirely confined to the
Shropshire iron district and after that time it spread rapidly through-
out England, Wales, and Scotland. As the century advanced coke-smelted
cast iron encroached on the sphere of wrought iron.
Employment of coke was important but "its results were less
momentous than those that were to follow the use of mineral fuel in the
16
fining process. The first reason for this, as mentioned above, is that
coke was applicable only to the production of castings and of forge pits
of low grade, so charcoal was still required to make bar iron of moderate
and good quality. Secondly, charcoal was cheaper than coke for smelting
the iron because 16 cwts, of charcoal would be sufficient to produce a
ton of pig iron; but to make a ton of bar iron about a ton and a half
of pigs was required and 2A cwts. of charcoal was consumed in the
17
operation. If malleable iron or steel was required, the "sow" and
"pigs" of cast iron had to be broken up, reheated, and hammered at the
forge to get rid of the excess carbon content. The reduction of the
carbon content in the pig iron could be made if the pig iron were reheated
16
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without coming into direct contact with the fuel. This could be done
by a special i^efining furnace between the operations of the blast
furnace and the forge. Throughout the early eighteenth century many
experiments were made with reverberatory furnaces, in which the metal
was kept separate from the fire, and heated by the action of the flame
18
in reverberating or shrinking down from the roof of the chamber. In
1766 the process was successfully introduced by Thomas and George
Cranage at Coalbrookdale. Their method immediately became a commercial
success.
Another process of reducing the proportion of carbon in the pig
iron was by stirring or "pudding" the molten metal while it was still
in the reverberatory furnace; this exposed the carbonic impurities
directly to the heat and burnt them out. Puddling seems to have formed
part of the Cranage's process. In 1784 patents for puddling processes
were taken out almost at the same time by Henry Cort and Peter Onions,
With his puddling process Cort combined and improved the rolling
machinery, which he had patented in 1783, Thus the combination of
puddling and improved rolling process facilitated the production of
superior bar iron and it avoided the necessity for reheating the metal
19
and thus saved both time and fuel.
In 1824 the hot-blast process was patented by Neilson. This
greatly reduced the amount of coal expended in the manufacture of each
ton of iron.
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In the raid-nineteenth century the world was moving from the
20
iron to the steel age. In 1856 Sir Henry Bessemer of England dis-
covered the process of making steel, a process since named after him.
Because steel was lighter, stronger, more flexible, and cheaper to
make. The new process brought about a minor revolution in Western
Europe and America. The process "consisted of blowing air into a
crucible containing molten pig iron. The air caused the pig iron to
burn and thus removed most of the carbon and silicon. The result was
21
a substantial increase in the output of iron and steel..." This
process required ores free from phosphorous; thus it decreased English
dependency on imported Spanish iron-ore.
In 1764 James Watt invented his steam engine and between 1775
and 1785 the importance of the new type of engine had been generally
recognized. The rotary motion made it possible to apply steam powers
directly to all kinds of industrial undertakings and steam engines
affected all the processor of the iron industry. In 1779 steam engines
were used for blowing furnaces and for working pumps in the collieries.
By 1780 there were engines to produce a blast for the smelting of iron,
A further stage in the application of steam power to the iron industry
came when the first forge hammer was moved by an engine. Finally to
the third and final process in iron production, rolling and steampower
were applied in 1789. Thus there was a general development in the
industry throughout the eighteenth century.
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In the age of wooden vessels, the construction of the ship was
uniform in all navies. According to William Hovgaard: "During several
hundred years its development had been extremely slow according to modern
ideas of progress, but with the introduction of steam power and the use of
22iron as the ship building material, a new era commenced,"
The first steam warship was Demologus
,
also called Fulton the First
,
23
which was designed and built by the American, Robert Fulton in 1812. The
following year, Fulton submitted his plans to the President of the United
States in 1814 Congress authorized the construction of this type of
vessel. The British Admiralty also' encouraged steam experiments and in
1815 England built Thames , Almost forty years elapsed between the appearance
of Robert Fulton's Clermont on the River Hudson in 1807 and the adoption
of steam by the major navies. The Royal Navy was no exception. The
introduction of steam propulsion into ships made slow progress for it was
first used only to move the greater ships clear of the land. Other than
this, there was neither any merchant vessel till 1822 nor any armed vessel
24
till 1828, under steam propulsion In the Royal Navy. Although in 1819
Savannah, the American ship which weighed more than 300 tons, made a voyage
22
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from America to Europe, she had no influence on the early projects for
25
transatlantic steam navigation. Launched as a sailing vessel, she
was afterwards fitted with a single-cylinder steam engine and with paddle
wheels which could easily be unshipped.
David Divine has claimed that much of the reluctance to use steam
26
was due to the difficulties in the supply of coal fuel. But this argument
cannot be completely accepted because there had been a sea-borne coal trade
for a hundred years and coaling stations could easily have been established,
as they were afterwards.
Steam, while still in its infancy, was less efficient as a method
of propulsion than sails. In addition, the use of steam power for large
warships was strongly opposed to many naval men. Hovgaard has quoted
from the English Steamship Manual of 1860 on this point:
Engines and machinery are liable to many
accidents, may fail at any moment, and there is no
greater fallacy than to suppose ships can be navi-
gated on long voyages without masts and sails.
These objections cannot be refuted. Early engines were liable to a break-
down that could be fatal in an engagement. The total weight of the machinery
including the coal was more than that of the sails and their masts and
rigging. Paddle wheels, the only form of propulsion before the invention
of the screw propeller in 1835, were exposed to the fire of the enemy shells;
the speed was relatively low and use of steam drastically cut down the
25
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cruising radius of a ship. Van Loon has suggested that the class of men
to which the naval officers of that day usually belonged regarded every-
thing associated with engineering as decidedly beneath their rank and
^. .
28
dignity. Moreover, the Government was against the steamship because of
the Channel problem and French invasion scare. The only tactical and
strategic advantage of the steam warship in the 1860 's was its independence
of wind and tide; in every other respect it was a less effective warship.
Though the Government and many naval officers did not accept the
29
use of steam in the ships, Rear-Admiral Sir John Ross and Captain W.
Bowles emphasized the value of the armored steamships for coastal defense,
30
and for operations generally in the narrow seas. At this Joseph Hume
commented, on 21 February 1825: "The Discovery of steam navigation has
altered the nature of maritime warfare altogether. Come war when it might,
the mode of warfare in the narrow seas would be very different from what it
„31
IS at present.
The widespread reluctance to adopt steam for battleships was even-
tually overcome by the development of the screw propeller, the actual invention
of which James Phinney Baxter has described as one of the five great naval
28
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32
revolutions. The first British ship which was ever moved by a screw was
the Government transport Doncaster. It left England for Gibralter in 1802,
having on board a shaft and screw propeller and some rope pulleys. In
Gibralter the necessary framing pulleys were placed out board, the
33
propeller was shipped and the ropes were rove. Doncaster . however, was
a sailing vessel.
The adoption on a wide scale of the screw propeller was due however
34 35
to Francis Pettit Smith, a Middlesex farmer, and John Ericsson, a Swedish
36
engineer in 1835. With Smith's Francis Smith and in Ericsson's Francis B.
Ogden and Robert F. Stockton , the world possessed her first practical screw-
driven vessels, Ericsson's screw propeller at first consisted of a short
drum, like a belt pulley, with blades around the circumference. Then he
used two propellers, a right-handed and a left-handed one, the outer,
being fixed to the propeller shaft, revolving in a sleeve which carried the
inner propeller. This sleeve was driven by toothed gearing and the pro-
37
pellers revolved in opposite directions as they do in a modern torpedo.
32
J, P. Baxter, Introduction to the Ironclad Warship . 3,
33
E. C. Smith, A Short History of Marine Engineering, 65.
34
Born in 1808 to a Middlesex farmer. In 1835 he build a model ship
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John Ericsson, a Swedish Army engineer who had deserted to compete
against George Stephenson in England with Steam Locomotives, invented the
screw propeller. He built a small vessel, Francis B. Ogden . after the then
American Consul in England. While the British Admiralty did not accept the
merits of screw propeller he came to America and through his influence got
the Navy to authorize the building of the screw steamer Princeton . In the
early 1840s he developed a stronger gun barrel by shifting from brittle cast
iron to wrought iron.
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Until the screw propellers were used the steam driven warships were propelled
by paddle wheels which, because of their vulnerability, were not suitable for
seagoing warships. Their use made possible the removal of paddle wheels
and the placing of machinery below the waterline where shot was not likely
to penetrate. Combination of screw propeller and broadside seemed to secure
simultaneously free movement and free fire power. The Admiralty, however,
ignored the importance of the screw propeller; they said:
even if the propeller had the power of propelling a vessel
if would be found altogether useless in practice, because the
power being applied in the stern it would be absolutely impossible
to make the vessel steer. ^°
The delay in the adoption of the screw propeller in warships was due to the
fact that the Admiralty thought that the engines would be different from
39those used with paddles and that new designs meant prolonged experiment.
John Ericsson later went to the United States and through his polit-
ical influence got the United States Navy to authorize the building of a
screw steamer, Princeton
,
which was the first such naval vessel. With
the appearance of Princeton , the Royal Navy was convinced of the merits
of the screw propeller and in 18A2-43 had the screw-sloop Rattler built.
By 1850 the Navy List included the names of about 50 screw vessels. Some
of these vessels were old sailing ships converted to screw ships, the
Agamemnon being the first line-of-battleship designed as a screwship.
Particulars of a few of the larger Screw Ships in Navy Lists of
January 1850:
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Displacement Nominal Indicate
Tons Guns H.P. H.P. Engine Makers
Aaamemnon 3750 91 600 1838 Penn
Aiax 3090 56 450 846 Maudslay
Amphion 2025 34 300 592 Miller
Arrogant • 2615 46 360 774 Penn
Blenheim 2790 60 450 938 Seaward
Dauntless 2150 33 580 1347 Napier
Highflyer 1775 21 250 702 Maudslay
Hosue 3054 60 450 792 Seaward
James Watt & Co.James Watt 4950 91 600 1543
Sans Pareil 3800 70 400 1471
It is interesting to take a survey of the period between 1860 to
1870, because this period is of peculiar concern to all who are familiar
with nautical affairs. The comparison of the battleships and mercantile
marine of 1860 with those of 1870 provides many striking constrasts. In
1860, though steam was used, the greater part of the work at sea was still
being done under sail. Though the British mercantile marine included some
700,000 tons of steamships, the sailing tonnage was some seven times larger.
Though, in the case of battleships, steam was used to a greater extent than
in the mercantile fleets, they still depended largely upon sail. With the
return of Edgar in 1870, the last of the line-of-battleships, after visiting
South America, the Cape, Australia, Japan, Honolulu, the Valparaiso, the era
bid goodbye to wooden ships, to sails and yards, to the
old Navy of Nelson's time. Henceforth came the era of
steam and iron, of torpedo and electricity; of what Is
called sciences versus keen observation which gained
41
40
41
42
E. C, Smith, A Short History of Marine Engineering . 75.
Ibid .. 161.
Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age . 23.
•47-
x g_J4i
CERBERUS
Dimensions 225' x 45' x 15«3' = 3,3A0 tons.
Hull and armour = 2,640 tons. Equipment = 700 tons.
Guns 4 tO-in. M.L.R. ("Magdala" 1892 4 8- in. B.L.).
Armour Sides 8"-6"; breastwork 9"-8"; turrets 10"-9".
Deck 1%"; breastwork deck 1"; backing ll"-9".*
Parkes, p. 167.
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every advantage possible to be taken from wind and
weather and which used to be called Seamanship.
The decade 1860-70 was an era of great changes in the character of
Warships which was illustrated by Smith with the examples of Victoria and
Devastation. In 1860 the finest British battleship was H. M. D. Victorian
an unprotected wooden sailing fighting ship with a full rig of sails and
steam power acting only as an auxiliary. Her length was 260 feet, breadth
60 feet, and she had a displacement of about 7000 tons. Her engines
developed 4200 horse power and her armament consisted of 121 guns. Victoria
was launched in 1859 and exactly ten years later, in 1860, H.M.S. Devastation
was launched and completed in 1873. Devastation was the first of the "mast-
less" turret ships. Her length was 285 feet and she was of 9300 tons dis-
placement. Her twin screw engines developed 6600 horsepower and gave her
a speed of 13 3/4 knots. She was built of iron throughout, carried four
35- ton, 12 inch guns, mounted in two turrets and was protected by 2540
tons of iron armor, the thickness of some of which was 14 inches. She
carried no sails and had only a single mast for signalling and for lifting
boats. Victoria's shots could pierce about 3 inches of iron, but Devasta-
44
tion's more than 12 inches.
By the beginning of the seventies the Admiralty generally recognized
that sails were a liability rather than an asset in an armored battleship
and, therefore, vessels built in the future were developments of the Devas-
tation . During 1867-68, when the question of Colonial Defence was under
consideration, the colony of Victoria in Australia wished to build a monitor
43
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for the defense of Melbourne. There were financial restrictions which
limited size and it was also suggested by the Victorian authorities that
a monitor fitted with a Coles turret passing through the deck would be
adequate. This both the First Lord and the constructor. Reed, refused to
consider because of difficulties in making the deck water-tight. After
a long discussion Reed agreed to a new type of monitor designed specially
with careful regard to the harbour at Melbourne, and he found the require-
ments as regards ordnance and armor very difficult to meet under the
45
restrictions imposed. Nevertheless, Cereberus was built to this design
and was noteworthy as being the first of a series of "breastwork" monitors
incorporating Reed's ideas as to the principles upon which low- freeboard
turret ships should be based. Two other ships, Magdala and Abyssinia
^
were built on the same design of Cereberus . These ships formed a connect-
ing link between the first phase of ironclad design which ended with Sultan
and Monarch and the second phase commencing with Devastation
.
In Cereberus there is to be found the germ idea of the principle
upon which all battleships from 1885 to 1905 were based: the placing of
the main battery in armoured positions fore and aft with uninterrupted bow
and stern fire and wide arcs of bearing upon either beam. Oscar Parkes
has given a detailed description of the construction of the Cereberus
.
She was built by Palmers and Company; laid down on 1 September, 1867,
launched on 2 December, 1868, and completed in September 1870. The cost
was 117,556. With a gross tonnage of 3,350, her dimensions were 225 'x45'
xl5*3'; her hull and armor weighed 2,640 tons; her equipment weighed 700
45 ' • -
All the information about the Cereberus are taken from Oscar
Parkes's, British Battleships
.
166-69.
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tons. Her armament consisted in four eighteen- ton, ten inch M. L. guns
which were retained by Cereberus throughout her career. She was also well
armored. Her turrets were 26^ feet in diameter with nine inch armor on
an 11 inchbacking, except over the faces, where it was 10 inch with 9
inch teak behind, these turrets always being hand worked. The hull sides
received 8 inch-6 inch armor with 11 inch-9 inch backing, the deck being
of 10 in teak with 1% inch plating. Heavier protection was given to the
breast work which had 9 inch-8 inch sides and ends, with a 1 inch iron deck
on 10 inch teak. Her complement was from 120 to 155 men and, carrying a
maximum of 210 tons of coal, her cruising speed was 9.75 kwts.
In these ships twin screws and a balanced rudder ensured optimum
maneuver ability and wholly replaced sail power, as once at their destination
they would never be required to make long open sea voyages. The special
pioneer features of the Cereberus
^
as Parkes has revealed, were: she was
the first British ship to have low freeboard; the first to have breastwork
protection; the first to have a central superstructure with fore and aft
turrets; and the first in which sail power was dispensed with altogether.
In everyway Cereberus was a complete break from established tradi-
tion. The hull had a freeboard of 3% feet only, with a central breastwork
for 112% feet amidship rising 7 feet above the deck. This did not extend
to the full beam by the width of a gangway on either side. Between the
turrets and extending well over them were the raised shelter deck for the
navigating positions and boats. By such structural expedients Reed kept
the characteristic low freeboard of the monitor but raised his turrets to
allow for their being in action clear of wave wash, with the provision
even of a hurricane deck.
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During the period between 1864 and 1871 a series of Coastal
Defense Turret "breastwork" monitors were built and these were:
Date Tons Knots Armament
Cereberus 1868 3,340 9.75 10" ML
Magdala 1870 3,340 10.6 10" ML
Abyssinia 1870 2,900 9.59 10" ML
Glutoon 1871 4,910 12.1 12" ML
Cyclops 1871 3,480 11. 10" ML
Gorgon 1871 3,480 11.1 10" ML
Hecate 1871 3,480 10.9 10" ML
Hydre 1871 3,480 11.2 10" ML
The production of a stell suitable for the construction of ships
was due to the efforts of the French Naval shipbuilding expert, J. Barbara
(later Chief Engineer of the Gensot Works). It was another French Naval
construction engineer, L. deBussy (later Director of Naval Construction),
who first employed this new material on a large scale in the construction
of three warships, namely, in Le Redoubtable. La Tonnerre, and Le Tempete,
47
laid down in 1873. The British Admiralty followed the French example in
1875, ordering two despatch vessels, the Iris and the Mercury to be built
wholly of steel. At first the cost of steel was higher than that of iron
and it was lacking in the qualities of ductility, malleability, and uniformity
of strength. The main reason for these drawbacks was that at the begin-
ning the steel was too hard to be manufactured with qualities so satis-
factory for shipbuilding as to produce such required special precaution
and experience in handling, especially when subjecting the raw material
46
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to heating. These difficulties disappeared when steel of softer quality,
known as mild steel was introduced.
After the development of a process of making mild steel two British
battleships. Colossus and the Edinburgh
,
were constructed of this material
in consecutive years 1886 and 1887. Their dimensions were 325 feet by
68 feet by 25-3 feet/26-3 feet. Total weight was 9.150 tons, of which
the hull and armor amounted to 6150 tons and equipment to 3000 tons. As
far as armament went: Colossus could boast of being the battleship in
which M. L. guns, iron construction and iron armor were all discarded
for the first time; both Collossus and Edinburgh had four 45 ton, 12 inch
B. L. guns, five 6 inch B. L. guns, four 6 pounders (added later) and 20
smaller guns. Both ships also had two 14 inch torpedo tubes placed for-
ward in a transverse battery, under the armor deck yet above water. The
armor of both ships was as follows: their citadels measured 123 feet
along the middle line, compared with 104 feet in Ajax and HO feet in
Inflexible
,
and shaped in a broad oval so that all but the most direct
of hits would be converted into glancing blows; it was of 18 inch thick-
ness on the sides and 16 inch at the ends, and extended from 6 feet 6
inches below water (6 inch deeper than in previous ships) to the main
deck height of 9 feet 6 inches. In short, the measurements of the com-
pound armor were as follows:
Citadel 18"-14"
turrets 16"-14"
deck 3"-2%"
skin 1"
teak 22"-10"
Total 2,414 tons (26.37.)
48
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In these ships steel was first used in general construction, only the
stem and stern posts being made of iron. In Edinburgh both turrets and
citadel were of steel-faced iron. Both ships had a complement of 396, and
carried 850/950 tons of coal. These were the first British battleships to
carry breech-loaders, first to have compound armor generally in place of
iron, first in which steel was used for general construction. They were
the last of the citadel ships proper and they had a metacentric height of
9 feet.
Though there was a considerable development in the technology which
consequently evolved ship construction in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, still in the eighties the British Admiralty faced problems. The
Russian scare of 1879 accentuated the complete lack of strategic and tactical
organization for the conduct of naval warfare and for the protection of
English commerce and overseas possessions. So the government formed an all
powerful committee to make a thorough investigation of the whole problem.
The report which the committee published showed that the Navy was not big
enough to perform all the duties which it was expected to fulfill and that
its -strength would have to be increased as soon as possible, which would
involve additional expenditure requiring a rise of three pence in Income
Tax. So between 1880 and 1884 the armored tonnage laid down and expenditure
on shipbuilding and Ordnance amounted to: Shipbuilding
Tonnage and Ordnance
1880 Collingwood 9,500 3,425,803
1881 Impericuse 8,400 3,736,669
Warspite 8,400
1882 Howe 10,300
Rodney 10,300
Camperdown 10,600 4,156,644
Benbow 10,500
1883 Anson 10,600 4,245,382
1884 Hero ;-v 6,200 4,607,237^^
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After the invention of the torpedo boat in the 1880s the Admiralty faced a
problem made clear by Lord Northbrook, First Sea Lord. In one of his
speeches he said:
When the noble Marquis (Lord Sidraouth) said that it
would be desirable that the Admiralty should have an un-
limited amount of money to spend on the present type of
ships of war, he felt bound to say that he was not of that
opinion. The great difficulty the Admiralty would have to
content with if they were granted 3 or A millions tomorrow
for the prupose referred to would be to decide how they
should spend the money. Anyone who had paid attention to
the progress made in the construction of guns must be aware
that the guns put on board the newest type of ships would
be able to destroy any armor which could be put on a vessel
... Some of the best naval officers in this country thought
that, in the event of another naval war, the torpedo would
be the most powerful weapon of offence, and would be able
to dispose of the most formidable ships in the service of
this or any other county. Therefore it would be most
imprudent greatly to increase the number of these enormous
machines.
Although the torpedo boats were still small and averaged under 100
feet in length they were tending towards larger sizes and greater speeds.
Experiments showed that boats attacking by night on fleets at anchor or at
slow speed ought generally to be successful. It was also determined that an
attack could only be repulsed by gunfire when not more than one boat attacked
one ship and that night attacks must always be in favor of the torpedo.
Experiments made by the Royal Navy showed that even if the ships were being
fitted with larger numbers of machine guns there was still no guarantee that
these had the power to stop a torpedo boat.
Certainly the presence of the torpedo boat made the future of the
big ship decidedly hazardous-- just as it has been when shell fire was first
directed against wooden hulls.
50
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Lord Northbrook finally decided that it was desirable to steadily
increase strength in armor-plated ships and cruisers. This heralded the
"Northbrook Program" of 1884 by which 3,100,000 of additional money was
provided for new construction during the next five years and resulted in
the battleships Victoria and Sans Peril , seven belted cruisers of the
^Australia" class, six torpedo cruisers of the "Archer" class and fourteen
torpedo being built.
The technological developments of shipbuilding industry reveals that
it was one of the most important factors why naval architecture changed.
However, improvements in naval armaments also played a very important role
in determining the naval ship design. So in the next chapter that aspect
will be discussed.
CHAPTER IV
Perhaps more valid Armes,
Weapons more violent, when next we meet
May serve best to us, and worse our foes.
Or equal what between us made the odds.
In Nature none
He who therefore can invent
With more forcible eve may offend
Our yet unwounded Enemies, or arme
Ourselves with like defence, to raee deserved
No less than for deliverance what we owe.
-- Paradise Lost, Bk. VI
Since antiquity the history of warfare has shown innumerable attempts
to secure an immediate tactical advantage by some new contrivance. The
essential purpose in such inventions is to obtain one's end before the
opposition party can bring the counter measures. In the development of
naval weapons up to 1600 the role of the scientist was non-existant.^ The
great revolution in naval warfare came slowly depending upon the development
of the sailing ship and on the evolution of weapons using gunpowder. By the
sixteenth century the standard fighting ship in the British Navy became the
galleon, a two-or three-decked ship with main batteries in the broadside
and lighter, quick-firing pieces fore and aft. Even the merchant ships
mounted culverins and demi-cannon. The sixteenth-century culverin was the
ancestor of the long eighteenth-century gun. The seventeenth century saw
1
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almost continuous naval warfare but there was very little advance in
naval technology although the Royal Navy had more and heavier guns. There
was hardly any change in the naval armament in most of the eighteenth century.
The cannons were still smoothbore, muzzle loaders made of cast iron or bronze,
' The thirty- two pounder, a three ton gun of about six-inch calibre, was the
biggest which a line-of-battleship could handle in its broadside. Naval
guns were still extremely inaccurate, having an effective range of less than
300 yds. At that time good gunnery meant speed and therefore volume of fire
3
and not accuracy. Even the gun carriages were still primitive, heavy timber
frames riding on four small wheels. The first decisive change, as Brodie
points out, in the nature of naval projectiles came at the end of the
eighteenth century, with the use of Mercier's shell gun during the siege
4
of Gibraltar, 1779-1783. This new projectile was a 5.5 inch explosive
shell with a short fuse fired from a 24-pounder mortar. But these shells,
"because of their real or presumed sensitivity, had to be tossed with small
propelling charges at high angles, othersiwe they might explode within the
bore," Thus till the eighteenth century the guns were basically same
though there were minor developments.
With the advent of nineteenth century there came some revolutionary
developments not only in naval construction but also in the naval armament
which in the second half of the nineteenth century passed through a series
of transformations, increasing its power manifold from decade to decade.
Professor Brodie notes that this
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It affected basic constructional machinery and ordnance--
the latter being a term which covers both guns and armor. The
same metallurgical advances that made possible the forging of
thicker and more resistant armor plates and the plates and
framing of the iron hulls, also made possible the construction
of stronger guns."
II
Of Baxter's five great naval revolutions of the nineteenth century --
steam, shell guns, the screw propeller, rifled ordnance and armor -- only
one, that is the shell gun, has had great influence on ship design and
equipment. The introduction of shell upset the balance between offense
and defense at sea and the need for armored ships became overpowering.
In 1815 the warships were still armed such as they had been for the
past four centuries. The introduction of the paddle wheel cut down the
number of guns a vessel could carry and this stimulated experiments toward
developing more effective gun-fire with fewer ordnance. These experiments
led to closely related developments; bigger and stronger guns, better shells
and shell guns, rifling, and breech- loading guns. Experiments after 1815
toward solving these problems were directed chiefly to strengthening gun
barrels to enable them to fire heavier projectiles with heavier charges
without bursting.
Paixhan's shell gun appeared in 1820. It was shorter and lighter
using smaller charges than guns of the same calibre designed for solid
shots. The shells were not only capable of tearing large holes in the
wooden sides, which were difficult to stop, they also endangered the safety
of the ship by their incendiary power, and the splinter effect was apt to
6
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cause a great number of casualties. Though both the French and the English
adopted the Paixhan gun in late 1830' s, (Shell guns were only adopted by
the British officially in 1839.) it was regarded merely as a special
purpose weapon, secondary to solid-shot ordnance. Shell exerted its effect
not through crushing impact but by producing a destructive explosion either
in the timbers of a ship or inside its hull. Until the introduction of the
shell gun, the 32-pounder was the standard heavy broadside weapon of British
line-of-battleships. The 68-pounder, introduced into the British Navy about
1840, was only used as a pivot gun but one of this type was carried even
by the largest warships. In the early forties Ericsson developed a stronger
gun barrel by shifting from brittle cast iron to wrought iron.
The idea of strengthening the decks or the sides of a ship so as to
make her invulnerable to the enemy was almost as old as the naval gun. It
has already been mentioned that one single shot from Paixhan' s shell gun
of 1820 was sufficient to destroy the largest ship. A partial answer to
this was the iron ship for iron is less a combustible material as there
would be no wooden splinters. But the French answer given by Paixhan was
armor which kept the shell out. Thus armor was better. General Paixhan
suggested that line-of-battleships should be protected by a layer of seven
or eight inches of iron armor.
In 1841 an American engineer, Robert L. Stevens, and his brother
Edwin A. Stevens, submitted to the United States Government plans for an
armored vessel, known as the Stevens Battery
.
Its construction started in
1854, The ship, although never completed, influenced both American and
Brodie, Bernard, Sea Power in the Machine Age, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1941), 181,
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English naval architecture of the later decades. Hovgaard has given a detailed
description of this ship:
The hull was built of iron, and special attention was given
to longitudinal strength. The machinery was housed entirely
below the water line, and was, moreover, protected by the
armor deck. . forward and aft of this so called casemate. The
armor deck was entirely flat and somewhat below the water line
when the ship was in fighting trim. The sloping casemate armor
inside which were housed the steam engines for training the guns,
was 6 3/4 inch thick and was made up of several layers of iron
plates, placed on heavy wood backing. The horizontal part of
the deck was 1 1/2 inch thick. Armor was fitted also below the
edge of the inclined armor outside the bottom plating to a depth
of four feet below the water-line.
^
Before she was completed Ericsson invented a gun which could easily pierce
plates of that thickness. Each improvement in armor was follower by the
development of more powerful guns that could penetrate it.
The destructive power of the shell was proved in the Schleswig-
Holstein War, when a Danish line-of-battle ship and a frigate were destroyed
by shell fire in 1849. The Crimean War showed more conclusive evidence in
this respect. In 1853 Russian squadrons attacked the Turkish fleet at
Sinope and destroyed it completely. In a battle which showed that wooden
hulls and even the unarmored iron hulls could not stand up to the fire of
shell guns,
III
These events showed the necessity of protecting the side of the battle-
ships by armor, and so armor was introduced in the 1850 's. In the begin-
ning of nineteenth century, guns were cast-iron, smoothe-bored, muzzle-
loading, and fired solid cast-iron round short or explosive spherical shells
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and the muzzle-loading gun was the standard weapon in all navies. About
1840 the 68-pounder gun was introduced into the British Navy. But this
was used only as a pivot gun and one of these was always carried on
even the largest warship. This was too heavy, slow burning and violent
in action to be used as a broadside gun, but Professor Brodie pointed out
that it made an admirable weapon for inflicting a few powerful blows
9during an approach. Although during the fifties breech loading rifled
guns, firing elongated projectiles with ogival heads, were constructed in
various countries, yet till the middle of the nineteenth century England
used muzzle-loading guns. It was not until after the Crimean War that
serious research began in the field of explosives and metallurgy.
Rifled ordnance appeared at least as early as 1832 but were not
perfected and were not introduced until the middle of the century. Rifling
was not introduced for the sake of greater penetration in naval ordnance
at sea but for better performance in the field. The use of improved rifles
had given such increased range and accuracy to the infantry and weapons
that field artillery, whose usefulness depended in good part upon the
greater range of the field gun over the land firearm, had rapidly lost
its importance. So naturally there was great enthusiasm in using rifling
in the naval service against unarmored ships. About 1860 ironclads were
built which was protected by armor of 4 1/2 in. thickness and this was
hardly perforated by the guns of the time. This forced the gunraakers
to direct their efforts toward manufacturing more powerful ordnance.
According to some, the best result was attained by large caliber smoothe-
bore guns which crushed and broke up the armor. It was argued also that
9
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in rifled guns only small charges could be used so only small velocities
could be attained.
In 1859 the 8- in. 4 3/4 ton, cast iron, smooth-bore gun of Warrior
was the most powerful weapon afloat in the British navy, but rifled,
breech- loading guns were made by Armstrong, and proved superior in range,
penetration and accuracy to smoothe-bore guns of the same calibers. ^° In
the same year breech-loading was accepted in all navies. Thus the intro-
duction of rifling had a great influence upon the early development of
armor- piercing ordnance. Since the introduction, the Armstrong-breech
loading guns was a source of difficulty, especially the 110-powder, as
there were many accidents with them, resulting in many guns needing or
actually undergoing repair. The behavior of the breech-loaders, as Oscar
Parkes writes, during the action at Kagosima in August 1863 practically
settled their fake job. Of the ships engaged which carried Armstrongs,
the
Euryalus (35) mounting 13 B.L. had 14 accidents in 144 rounds
Perseus (17) " 5 B.L. " 5 " " m "
Argus (6) " 1 B.L. " 4 " " 22 "
Racehorse ((4) " 1 B.L. " 4 " " 51 "
Coquette (4) " 1 B.L. " 1 " " 37 " 12
In addition to the accidents the breech-loader's shootings was erratic
and often much delayed, shells going "anywhere but straight forward and as
much as 600 yds. to the left" and a lot failed to explode. For these
reasons the 110-pound were withdrawn after this action, and thus the first
13breech- loading phase came to an end in 1864. Now the Navy was faced with
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the problem of finding an armor-piercing gun for the ships awaiting com-
pletion. Although the 68-pdr. gun with steel shot could perforate the
4 1/2 inch plate and 7-inch timber of Warrior , there was no pressing
reason why the 68-pdr. should be displaced by a longer gun or armor in-
creased beyond 5 1/2 inch in thickness. Moreover, the British Navy be-
lieved that with 4 1/2 to 5 1/2 inch plating and 68-pdrs. it would be able
to cope with the French and American navy. Although Armstrong held the
difficulties could be overcome, he yielded to the opinion of the naval
authorities and constructed a new type of rifled muzzle-loader, which
proved satisfactory also with heavier calibers. This is known as the
Somerset gun and it fired 100-pound shot. With the introduction of Somer-
set further development of smooth-bore gun was continued and in 1865 four
"exceptional monsters" of 13-inch caliber muzzle-loader were built which
fired 600-pound shot.
During the period 1863 to 1878 the smoothe-bore heavy guns grew as
follows:
Gun Proj Charge
tons lb. lb.
9-in. 6k 100 25 Woolwich "Somerset"
10.5-in. 12 156 35 Woolwich
13-in. 22% 600 Armstrong not accepted
There were two other significant developments during this period.
The first was the armor-piercing projectile designed by Joseph Whitworth.
This projectile was constructed in the shape most suitable for penetrating
armor, and the second was the introduction of a tough and hard steel which
would neither break into pieces nor absorb work-energy in altering its own
14
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shape. During this same period Capt. A. T. Blakely of Royal Navy demon-
strated the working of hooped guns. Blakely was the first to propose
guns formed of concentric tubes having different degrees of elasticity,
the inner tube being the most elastic because of the greater demands made
upon it.
According to Professor Baxter the influence of these new weapons on
the history of the ironcladships, before the Battle of Hampton Roads had
three phases: first, the destructive power of the new guns proved an
irresistable argument in favor of defensive armor; second, several years
of experiments proved wrought ironplates 4% inch thick resisted the best
of the old guns and the first of the new so successfully that England began
a large program of ironclad warships; and finally, the temporary success of
the 4% inch plates led the makers of ordnance to redouble their efforts.
The introduction of the muzzle- loading rifled gun of sixteen centi-
meters in 1855 in the French fleet contributed powerfully to the decision
by the French Ministry of Marine to adopt defensive armor. At first this
armor served only a defensive purpose. The temporary superiority of the
4% inch armor over the best guns of the day led to the evolution of naval
architecture and not only in France and England but the second rank mari-
time powers also began to build armored vessels. In the meantime the
British Admiralty received hundreds of proposals for the improvement of
armor. These suggestions consisted of steel, iron with its outer surface
case-hardened, lead, wire rope, hemp matting, or alternate bars of iron
and wood. As Baxter notes: "While many suggested new ways of fastening
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doing away with the backing altogether, and putting the wood in front of
the plates, a few thought corrugated armor would afford adequate resistance
with reduced weight."
On March 13, 1860, the Special Committee on Iron Plates and Guns re-
ported to the War Office that vessels protected by wrought iron plates of
4% inches thickness were "to all practical purposes, invulnerable against
any projectile that can at present be brought to bear against them at any
range." It also demanded "that they should be backed as strongly as possible,
18
and firmly golted and nutted,"
Some experiments were made of wrought-iron embrasures in fortifications
during 1859-1860 and forced the Ordnance Select Committee to report that
there was "very good ground for believing that iron screens or targets
would resist the heaviest shot and would prove of the greatest value in
protecting casemates, "•'•"
In 1862 the Warrior target was pierced by a spherical shot of 150
20
pounds fired from an Armstrong 200-pounder constructed as a smoothe-bore.
Professor Brodie thinks that this penetration by a gun entirely practical
for mounting on ship board was the most significant victory of the gun over
the armored ship since the sea-going ironclad had been introduced.^ In less
than six months time the Warrior target was completely perforated at 600 yds,
by a Whiteworth 130-pound flat-headed shell loaded with a 3%-lb, bursting
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charge. Two months later a shell of 151 pounds weight with a 5 pound
bursting charge penetrated a 5- inch plate and burst in the backing. In
1863, a 610-pound steel shell containing a 24-pound bursting charge was
fired from an Armstrong 13-inch gun at a range of 1,000 yds., and smashed
,
a large hole entirely through the Warrior target, exploding at the instant
of its passage through the plate. In March, 1863, in the House of Commons
attempt was made by Lord Paget, one of the members of the opposition party,
to repute Whitworth's assertion of piercing any armor plating not only with
22
shot but with shell. It seemed that the only answer to this would be to
strive for heavier armor and to build bigger ships to carry it. By 1864
the Bellerophon was built which had six inches of armor plates over 1% inch
iron inner skin with 10 inches of teak backing between--and at that time
it was considered the strongest ship afloat. It had a 9-in. 12 ton rifled
gun which threw 250-lb. projectiles capable of perforating 10-in. of armor
at a range of 1000 yds.
During the year 1861-1864 further tests were made. These did not
prove that a 4% inch plate would not offer greater resistance, especially
to spherical shot, when placed obliquely than when placed vertically. The
tests also concluded that a given weight of iron would afford more pro-
tection if disposed in vertical plates than if disposed in thinner plates,
of necessarily greater surface, placed obliquely to protect the same
vertical area. Attempts were made to eliminate the wood backing behind
the armor. But the experiments proved the necessity of wood backing,
showing that: ' '•
However much the armor plates may be supported by
direct contact with a rigid backing of iron, and however
22
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desirable it may seem to exclude wood or other perishable
material from them, yet the concussion is so injurious to
the fastening of a rigid structure, that in the present
state of our knowledge it would be unwise to recommend the
abandonment of wood backing. -^
For the three new ironclads, Agincourt, Minotaur and Northcumberland
the Admiralty reduced the wood backing from 18 inches behind the plates
of Warrior to 9 inches, while it increased the thickness of the armor
plates from 4% to 5% inches. By 1865 the principle of armor definitely
became defensive, but it also became a problem to keep pace with the rapid
improvement of naval armament. Thus the whole subsequent history of pro-
tection on the battleship involved both the development of armor in thick-
ness and quality to meet the constantly increasing offensive power of the
naval gun and also the limitation of the extent of that armor on the sides
of the ships to save weight and this made possible extension of other
.
desirable qualities.
According to Brodie in this long race between ordnance and armor
there are certain factors which it is important to consider. First, the
projectile designed primarily to penetrate armor cannot also be designed
to have the maximum bursting effect upon impact. It must have thicker
walls than the shell that is not required to perform such work, which
leaves less room for an explosive change. Second, the mere fact that
armor can be perforated does not mean that it is useless in actions, for
the conditions under which it is penetrable may occur only infrequently in
battle. Third, the armorclad might be penetrable even in the region of its
23Quoted by Baxter in Introduction of the Ironclad Warships on 203
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thickest armor, but if so, it was penetrable only by the largest ordnance.
It could not be perforated by small guns. The opposition would not be
dangerous unless it carried the largest ordnance, a requirement which
inevitably reduced the number of its guns and their role of fire. Fourth,
as guns increased in power they were utilized at longer ranges, armor
which failed to exclude shot at 3,000 yds. might be quite effective against
25
6,000 yds. In 1864 France adopted two new guns, one of 7 3/4 tons and
the other of 15% tons. These guns made the armor inadequate even before
ships were completed. It became necessary in 1865 to build ships with
heavier armor. So the ships, which carried at the water-line 8-inch
plates upon a backing of 32% inches of timber, were projected. But even
before the first of these ships was launched in October, 1868, its armor
proved insufficient against the 23-ton guns which then came to use.
Before the construction of the Bellerophon
. which has already been
mentioned, was completed, the construction of the Hercules with 9-inch
armor was projected. Of this Lord Paget said, "In other respects she will
be very similar to the Bellerophon
^
and as regards her armament, she will
be armed with the newest fashion of guns, whatever that may be in next
26
year." The board of the armor on Hercules was 40 inch teack backing and
2% inches of additional iron plate. In 1869 it was necessary to begin a
ship carrying a water line belt of 10-inch to 12-inch armor and a turret
plating of 14 inches. Devastation was completed in 1873. She was armed
with 35-ton muzzle-loading rifles. She has been called the first modern
battleship, since she combined for the first time in a large sea-going
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vessel the use of the turret system in the housing of the batteries and
.-, 27
complete freedom from perils.
Before Devastation was completed, it was necessary for England to
build a new type of ship which would keep pace with the recent battle-
ship development in Italy. The great Italian constructor Benedetto Brin
planned to lay down two ships called Dhilio and Dandolo in 1872. Carrying
four 100- ton guns in a heavily armored citadel they introduced the monster
28
guns and created a big impression. They had a thick belt amidships and
relied upon a protective deck and internal subdivisions for integrity fore
and aft. They were the largest and most powerful battleships of their day
29
and served as a model for British battleship Inflexible . Inflexible was
completed in 1881. Her dimensions were 320' x 75' x 2A'5'/ 26'5'=11,880 tons.
She carried 4 16-in. 80- ton muzzle-loaders and 6 20 powders. Her most
interesting features were, as Parkes pointed out, echelon turrets amidships
carrying the heaviest guns in the service; an impregnable citadel carried
in a hull having high fore and aft superstructures, with the ends covered
by an armored deck below water above which was exclusive subdivision to
localize flooding; thicker armor than any ship before or since.
Inflexible is one of the milestones in the history of British naval
architecture because it was the precursor of central citadel ships and
as the first capital ship in which the under-water armor deck was used
in place of vertical armor along the water line. She was a complete
27
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departure from all previous standards of design, and of gun power, armor
thickness and disposition of armament. It has already been noted that
it carried 16-in. muzzle-loading guns which fired a 1,684.16 pound pro-
jectile with a muzzle velocity of 1,950 ft. seconds and able to pierce
23 in. of iron at 1,000 yds.^° The firing rate was about one round per
gun per minute. The armor was 24 inches thick. Armor never increased in
thickness for two reasons: its quality improved, which meant that it had
equal or superior resistance power and the coming of the quick firer in
the secondary armament necessitated the temporary abandonment of the
citadel type of protection. Thus the armor had proceeded since the days
of Warrior from 4% inches to 24 inches in the days of the Inflexible and
the armament had proceeded from 68 pounders of 4 3/4 tons to 16-inch rilfes
of 80 tons. So almost till the end of the seventies muzzle-loader was the
standard gun in the British Navy. From that time on, calibers and veloci-
ties steadily increased, and although the thickness of armor likewise went
on increasing, the perforating power of the guns in general kept well in
advance of the resistance offered by the armor which can be proved by
mentioned the case of the Dreadnought (1875). It was protected by 14 in,
armor and it carried 12% in,, 38-ton guns which fired 820-lb, projectiles
with a muzzle-velocity of 1575 ft. which was capable of perforating 17 3/4 in.
of iron at 100 yds.
In the seventies slow-burning powder was invented and by the 1880 's
it was introduced generally. With this the initial velocity of the pro-
jectiles could be raised from about 1600 to 2000 ft. per second and the
perforation power greatly increased. However, slow-burning powder, in
order to develop its energy, required longer guns, in which it was difficult
30
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to perform the loading operation through the muzzle. Therefore it forced
the adoption of breech- loading system. There were other technical advantages
of this system, such as a more stable trajectory resulting in greater accuracy
of fire. There was also the advantage that the men were less exposed when
loading and that the smoke was discharged outside the turret instead of
the recoil bringing the still smoking muzzle inside on return to the loading
position.
The earlier breech-loaders had been dangerous because they could be
fired without the breech properly closed. However, these breech-loading
guns overcame that problem by developing automatic safety devices attached
to the breech which prevented the gun being discharged until the interrupted
screw action had locked. The breech-loading gun was reintroduced in 1878
and gradually better mechanical devices were adopted and finally by 1880
the English adopted them and at the same time the Woolwich system of con-
struction was abandoned because it was decided to use steel for all parts
of the guns. The Colossus and the Edinburgh completed respectively in 1886
and 1887, were the first British battleships to carry breech-loaders. They
carried a main armament of 9,150 tons, of four 12-in., A5 ton breech-loading
guns, five 6-in. breech-loading guns, and twenty smaller guns. Apart from
carrying the breech-loading guns, they were first to have compound armor
generally in place of iron, the first in which steel was used for general
construction, and the last of the citadel ships proper.
It was originally planned that Colossus and Edinburgh would carry four
38-ton M.L.R. and four 6-in. B.L. But in 1882 when Woolwich guns were com-
pletely discarded the Board of Admiralty armed the ships with 12-in. 25
caliber breech-loading guns. At the end of eighties cordite was intro-
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duced in England and completely took the place of old-time gunpowder for
artillery purposes. Cordite was smokeless and, being very slow burning
and efficient, allowed a further increase in the length of guns and in
the developed energy.
Not only guns and projectiles but also their mountings and sights
also had improved during the period. All these naturally resulted in an
increasing thickness of defensive armor. As such added weight tended to
impair ships' speeds, the metallurgists turned their attention to this
problem. Compound armor consisting of a hard steel face with a soft iron
backing, was introduced in 1879 and permitted a reduction to 18 in. in
thickness and a consequent valuable saving in weight. By 1890 all steel
armor came in use and in 1892 it was discarded in favor of nickel-steel
alloys with hardened face,
IV
Bushnell was the first man to show that a change of gunpowder can be
made to explode under water. This is of tremendous importance because
successful use of the mine in naval warfare depends upon it. Mines had
been used previously in the 1790' s but proved ineffective because the
energy of the explosion was dissipated by expansion of the gasses in the
air. Bushnell realized that in order to be effective, a mine must be well
submerged below the surface. He devised means for exploding gunpowder
under water and constructed mines of various types.
About twenty years later, Robert Fulton experimented with submarine
mines and was the first inventor of the anchored mine. He proved the
effect of underwater explosions by blowing up small vessels in France and
England. However, the British naval authorities were strongly opposed to
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this weapon, because it threatened the supremacy of the British on the
sea, and Fulton was not encouraged any further. After his return to America
in 1806 he asked the United States Government to support his inventions
and submitted projects for several different "torpedoes"—which term was
used at that time to describe all kinds of contraptions for exploding gun- -
powder under water. Mines were used in Schleswig-Holstein War (1848-51)
and in the Crimean War (1854-56).
After the American Civil War the mine became the permanent link in
the naval defences throughout the world and a more systematic development
began which soon influenced the design of the warship. Finally the term
"torpedo" became restricted to such weapons as towing and spar torpedoes
and specially automobile torpedoes by all of which the explosive charge
in some way or other was actively carried or propelled against an enemy
ship and the tem "mine" was applied where the explosive charge was used
in a passive, usually anchored, manner. Gradually two types of mines
were developed; "observation" and "contact". Either the observation mines
rest on the bottom of the sea or they are buoyant and moored at a fixed
distance from the bottom. They are fired at will by an electric current
when an enemy ship is observed to be near the mine and are controlled from'
a station on shore. Contact mines are designed to explode when struck by
a ship; they are usually kept at a certain depth below the surface. Many
modern mines are activated by impulse. <
30
In the sixties, mines and spar torpedoes introduced a minor water-tight
30
Spar torpedoes consisted of small charges of gunpowder or dynamite
fixed on the end of long poles fitted to smaller craft. They were used in
all navies and were used in the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1875.
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subdivision of warships. However, being limited in their applicability,
these weapons could not influence naval architecture. In the seventies
efforts were made to produce automobile torpedoes "by means of which sub-
marine attack could be carried out from ships or boats at a relatively
great range from the enemy;" and before the end of the decade a successful
solution had been found in the Whitehead torpedo. In 1870 Whitehead ex-
hibited a torpedo which was 14 ft, long and maintained a speed of 8 kts.
over a range of 300 years; it carried 67 lb. of gun cotton. The Whithead
torpedo was rapidly developed to a practicable and powerful weapon and
31
by 1880 was being introduced in all navies, and so torpedo boats appeared.
32
The essential secret of the early Wliitehead torpedo was the mechanism
by which the machine could be made to run at any required depth. Torpe-
does threatened the supremacy of the armored battleships which caused much
concern in the great navies. The destructive power of the torpedo and the
failure of the ships to resist its attack led people to believe that the
battleship armed with heavy ordnance and protected by thick armor was destined
to disappear at once and there therefore only small vessels armed with light
33
guns or perhaps with a single heavy gun ought to be constructed.
In England, small, fast, heavily armed cruisers, protected by an
armored deck and a cellular layer, were advocated by Lord Armstrong. These
arguments were as Hovgaard writes: "To resist the most powerful guns afloat.
31
Hovgaard, History of Modern Warships ^ 452.
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Whitehead Torpedo was introduced by Robert Whitehead, an Englishman,
who was a manger of an engineering factory at Fiume in Hungary.
33
Hovgaard, History of Modern Warships . 452,
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armor of at least 2 feet in thickness is required, whence it has been
necessary to rebuilt the area of armor surface to even- narrowing limits,
leaving a large portion of the ship without protection." Ironclads are
no more secure against the attack from torpedoes and rams than unarmored
vessels. The function of armor may in a very considerable degree be ful-
filled by coal, if judiciously applied for that purpose. Sail rigging
should be abandoned, whereby a greater supply of coal can be carried and
the coal protection can be improved. By introducing an under-water deck
with divisional spaces, comprising cork cofferdams and coal spaces above
the deck, an unarmored ship may be rendered almost incapable of being sunk.
For the cost of one ironclad may be had three unarmored ships of higher
speed, carrying collectively three armaments, each equal to that of the
armored vessel. If matched in combat, the three smaller ships would be
able to overwhelm the armored ship with their fire or, if the armor was im-
penetrable to the guns, they could destroy the ironclad by ramming or by
using their torpedoes. Hence, ironclads can not be needed for the purpose
of opposing ironclads; for this, as well as for all other service, a
numerous fleet of smaller and swifter unarmored vessels carrying a power-
ful armament are preferable. It appears expedient that the chief expendi-
ture should be upon this class of vessels.
For the naval contractor it is quite important to know the effects
that are likely to be produced by the explosion of mines and torpedoes on
a given structure and to provide the best means of protecting a ship
damaged in this way. Various countries made experiments on this but
^Sbid., 454.
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according to Professor Hovgaard the results have been kept secret. The
results of the experiments which are known are all after 1893. For this
reason present writer will not discuss these experiments.
In short because of the torpedo a new type of ships appeared. First
came the small, fast torpedo boat, designed to carry torpedoes as its
main armament; secondly, torpedo-gunboats and destroyers, in other words
anti- torpedo boats; and finally came the submarine whose success depended
mainly on the Whitehead torpedo.
As soon as the torpedo boats became a part of the navy, naval archi-
tects developed counters in the quick-firing gun and the torpedo-boat-
destroyer which soon made the simple torpedo boat obsolete, only to re-
usurp itself the functions of the boat it had been created to destroy. At
the same time protection against locomotive torpedoes seemed to be assured
for ships at anchor by the use of nets. These were of the early Bullivant
type made up of steel wire rings 6% in. diameter joined by small steel
rings, and weighing only 1 lb. per sq. ft. They were slung out on long
booms triced up high above water by stays from the derricks or mast heads
and hung to hull depth; extended trials proved them capable of stopping
the slow 14- in. torpedo which it was feared might then explode and destroy
the net. The booms were carried along the sides in turret ships, but
usually stowed inboard in broadside ships except for a pair triced up at
As far as can be determined, none of these experiments has since come
into print.
35
Ibid., 534.
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the bows and stern. The cumbersome ceroline took a long time to get fixed
into position and longer still to restow, and could only be used with the
ship at anchor.
The first idea of armor protection against under-water attack was
made by Reed in 1884. In his proposal he designed a ship with an armored
double bottom 4 in. -3^ in. -2% in. with the thickest portion over the sides
with the 8 ft. space between it and the outer bottom subdivided trans-
versely and longitudinally. This armored screen ran under the machinery,
boilers and magazines and, as he described it:
The torpedo will be stopped and compelled to explode out-
side the inner bottom, and the debris of that bottom will be
dashed against the inner armor which will of course be vastly
more difficult of penetration by this debris than the ordinary
3/8-in. steel plating which at present is all that separates
the boilers etc, from the outer bottom."^"
The scheme was satisfactory as regards weight. But the deep double bottom
raised the boilers and engines so that they were partially above the heater
line and directly exposed to gun fire which could penetrate the belt. For
this reason the Board of Admiralty rejected his proposals. In the seventies
"machine guns" of various types (Catling, Nordenfelt) made their appearance
as defence against torpedo boats. They evolved from small arms and rich
calibers of 1 in. to 1% in. All the early machine guns had several barrels.
Due to the growing size of the torpedo-boats and the greater range of
the torpedoes, it was necessary to increase the power of the guns that were
to fight this new enemy. The multiple-barrel type was too heavy and the
automatic principle was not applicable to guns of greater caliber. So the
"quick-firing" or "rapid-firing" guns, single-barrelled weapons character-
ized by a quick-acting system of operation, and by the use of cartridge cases.
36
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which at least for the smaller calibers contained both the powder and the
projectile, came into being.
During the last years of the eighties, Armstrong made several im-
portant improvements in the center-pivot mountings, which contributed
greatly to the success of the quick-firing guns.
Another great advance was made in about 1890 by the introduction of
smokeless powder, which gave higher initial velocities and was practically
free from the smoke formation which hindered a rapid firing of guns and the
used cartridge were gradually discontinued for the large calibers. About
the same time high explosives began to be used for bursting charges in the
shells, and the manufacture of armor-piercing projectiles was much improved.
By the beginning of nineties there were not only machine-guns and light
quick-firers, such as the 3 in. Q.F. gun, suitable for use against torpedo-
boats, but also more powerful quick-firers capable of piercing armor of
light and medium thickness, and of demolishing unprotected structures by
a great volume of shell fire. Armstrong specialised in quick-firers of
great caliber, and, besides the 4.7 in. gun, constructed 5.5 in. and 6-in.
guns. According to Professor Hovgaard these Q.F. guns took the place of
breech- loading guns.
The quick-firing gun and the attendant torpedo-boat destroyers were
quite adequate to fend off torpedo attacks. Only against stationary ships
were torpedo attacks already to have any success and for that reasons
torpedo boats were painted in black, so as to achieve surprise at night.
Though these are some of the most important developments in armaments
in the Royal Navy during the period 1815-1893, however, this was a near
universal trend because of the increasing attention paid by such countries
as the United States, Japan, Italy and Germany to the strengthening of
their naval forces.
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CONCLUSION
This descriptive essay shows that the British navy of the nineteenth
century had definitely experienced certain changes which ultimately put
the navy well on the road to becoming the "Navy of Fisher, of Jellicoe,
and of Cunningham." These changes were mainly due to technological
expansion and the advancement of armaments. These were, however, not
the sole causes; the political rivalry between France and England and the
economic prosperity of the latter were also responsible for the changes
and the developments which the nineteenth century British navy accomplished.
It can be said that the political rivalry and the economic prosperity led
to the general technological growth which ultimately changed and improved
the British navy of the last century. Thus it can be concluded that the
evolution of the technology was directly responsible while the political
rivalry and the economic prosperity were indirectly responsible for the
growth and betterment of the English navy of the last century.
1
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ABSTRACT *
Man started to build boats of sorts before the dawn of civilization.
Gradually the methods of constructing ships were completely changed. However,
until the nineteenth century the process of change was very slow in comparison
with modern ideas of progress; the warship of Horatio Nelson was largely that
of Drake and construction was uniform in all navies. But with that century
came a revolution in the naval architecture, which made the battleship of
Fisher and Jellicoe a very different entity from that of Nelson. What was the
reason behind this revolution? A close examination of the English political
situation shows that the long period of peace after the Napoleonic War, weak-
ness of the continental land power and specially the Anglo-French rivalry on
the question of naval supremacy played a very significant role in this revo-
lution. On the other hand the importance of economic conditions cannot be
ignored. The Industrial Revolution began in England about the middle of the
eighteenth century and resulted in Britain being the prime industrial nation
of the world for most of the nineteenth century. During this time there was
an increase in the availability of iron ore which consequently became very
cheap, while at the same time there was an acute problem of a dearth in
supplies of suitable timber for ship construction. The destructive force of
shell fire rendered wooden walls obsolete; therefore, shipwrights began to
use iron for ship construction and the first iron-steamer, the Aron Manaby .
was built by the Horsley Company of Staffordshire in 1820. But the Admiralty
ignored this important revolution. With the use of two iron paddle steamers
namely Plaeeathon and Nemesis as gunboats in the First Opium War of 1839-40
the iron ousted wood as the basic material for hulls.
The technological developments had the most influence in the revolution
of naval architecture. Both in the introduction of steam power and in the use
of iron as the ship building material, a new era commenced. Though the
Admiralty built the Thames , the first steamship in England, in 1815, because
of the extreme conservativeness at first it was reluctant to accept steam
vessels. This reluctance to adopt steam for battleships was eventually over-
come by the development of the screw propeller. By late 1830s the world
possessed her first practical screw driven vessels. Characteristically the
Admiralty refused to accept the screw propeller. The delay in its adoption
in warships has been attributed to the fact that it required engines different
in design from these used with paddles and that new designs meant prolonged
experiments and loss to vested interests. In 1870s the naval contractors
tried to use steel for the ship construction. But the Admiralty did not
accept the steel ships because at the beginning steel was more expensive than
iron and it lacked ductility, malleability, and uniformity of strength. These
difficulties disappeared when steel of softer grades, known as milder steel
was introduced. In 1886-87 Colossus and Edinburgh were the first battleships
built in steel by the Admiralty.
In 1815 the warships were still armed such as they had been for the past
four centuries. The introduction of the paddle wheel cut down the number of
guns a vessel could carry and this stimulated experiments towards developing
more effective gun-fire with fewer ordnance. These experiments led to closely
related developments; bigger and stronger gun§, better shells and shell guns,
rifling and breech-loading guns. Paixhan's shell gun came out in 1820. It
was shorter and lighter using smaller charges than guns of the same calibre
designed for solid shots. The English officially adopted it in 1839. The
destructive power of Paixhan's shell gun showed the necessity of protecting
the sides of the battleships by armor so armor was introduced by 1850.
The submarines appeared in the last quarter of the eighteenth century
but until the American Civil War it did not become the permanent link in the
naval defenses throughout the world and soon a more systematic development
began which influenced the design of the warship. In the seventies torpedoes
were introduced. As soon as torpedo boats became a part of the navy, naval
architects developed counters in the quick firing gun and the torpedo-boat-
destroyer which soon made the simple torpedo boat obsolete, only to resume
itself the functions of the boat it had been created to destroy. The machine
guns and "quick-firing" were also invented in the seventies to fight against
the torpedoes.
Though these are some of the most important developments in armaments
in the Royal Navy during the period 1815-1893, however this was a near universal
trend because of the increasing attention paid by such countries as the United
States, Japan, Italy, and Germany to the strengthening of their naval forces.
